Relaxing credit constraints in emerging economies: the impact of public loans on the productivity of Brazilian manufacturers by Lage de Sousa, Filipe & Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P.
1 
 
 Relaxing Credit Constraints in Emerging Economies: 
The impact of public loans on the productivity of 
Brazilian manufacturers 
 
 
Filipe Lage de Sousa* 
Brazilian Development Bank and Universidade Federal Fluminense 
 
Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano** 
London School of Economics, University Bocconi Milan, CEP and CEPR 
 
October 2017 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In emerging economies credit constraints are often perceived as one of the most 
important market frictions hampering firm productivity growth in manufacturing. Huge 
amount of public money is devoted to the removal of such constraints but its 
effectiveness is still subject to an intense policy debate. This paper contributes to this 
debate by analyzing the effects of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) loans. 
Exploiting the unique features of a dataset on BNDES loans to Brazilian manufactures, 
it finds that credit constraints facing Brazilian manufacturing firms are real, in particular 
for firms that apply to BNDES repeatedly, and BNDES support has allowed granted 
firms to match the performance of similar unconstrained firms but not to outperform 
them.  
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Highlights 
i. BNDES provides loans aimed at enhancing the productivity of manufactures. 
ii. Beneficiaries are credit constrained, in particular if they apply repeatedly.   
iii. Beneficiaries perform as similar unconstrained firms at least in the short run. 
iv. Beneficiaries do not outperform similar unconstrained firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Large emerging economies, such as Brazil, China and India, are considered the 
“markets of the future” as promising destinations for sales as well as worrying origins 
of new tough competitors. At the same time, manufacturers from those countries feel 
they are not able to compete on a level playing field with manufacturers from more 
advanced economies due to all sorts of market failures. In particular, credit constraints 
are often perceived as one of the most important market frictions constraining 
innovation, growth and performance as they hamper the entrepreneurial efforts of local 
firms. While huge amounts of public money are being devoted to the removal of such 
constraints, their effectiveness is still subject to an intense policy debate. Banerjee and 
Duflo (2014) is an example of the related recent literature. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by investigating the case of 
Brazil. The Brazilian government provides long-term loans through the Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (henceforth, BNDES), a development bank 
whose main statutory goal is to improve Brazilian economic competitiveness without 
neglecting broader social and environmental aspects.1 BNDES invests in several areas 
including research and development, infrastructure, export support, regional and urban 
development. More specifically, in the case of manufacturing, BNDES finances long-
term projects aimed at the creation of new plants, the enlargement of existing ones, the 
restructuring and the modernization of production processes, innovation and 
technological development. Projects are supported through loans at subsidized interest 
rates. All firms located in Brazil are eligible, including foreign owned ones. Moreover, 
banks in the private sector tap BNDES resources to provide loans for their clients’ long-
term projects. As a result, long-term loans in the Brazilian economy are mainly offered 
                                                
1 Carvalho (2014) provides a short historical description of BNDES. 
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by BNDES funds, either by BNDES itself or by other banks using BNDES resources.2 
Unsurprisingly, the importance of BNDES in the Brazilian economy is, therefore, quite 
sizeable: in 2012 its disbursements reached the value of 76 billion dollars, representing 
20% of aggregate investment.3 When compared with that of other development banks, 
the size of BNDES financing becomes even more impressive. For instance, in 2012 the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank disbursed 19.8 and 6.9 billion 
dollars respectively.4 In comparison, BNDES financing reached nearly three times their 
combined disbursements.5  
While acknowledging that BNDES project analysis involves several other 
dimensions including social and environmental aspects, this paper focuses on the 
narrower assessment of the overall impact on the performance of Brazilian firms in 
terms of productivity. Do BNDES loans help relax credit constraints that hamper 
productivity growth in Brazilian firms? We address this question by exploiting the 
unique features of a micro-dataset drawn from a variety of sources: the Annual 
Industrial Research of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics; the Annual 
Social Information Report of the Ministry of Labor; the Foreign Trade Secretary of the 
Ministry of Industrial Development and Foreign Trade; the Foreign Capital Census and 
the Central Bank Register of Brazilian Capital Abroad of the Brazilian Central Bank; 
and BNDES itself. The period covered is 1995-2007.6 
Our focus on productivity is driven by the fact that, as already discussed, for 
manufacturing projects the stated aim of long-term BNDES loans is essentially to 
enhance physical productive efficiency through the economies of scope and scale 
                                                
2 See De Boulle (2015) for a detailed discussion of how BNDES interest rates are subsidised and their 
impacts in the credit market.  
3 Information accessed on December 22nd, 2016 at BNDES website (www.bndes.gov.br).  
4 According to World Bank (2013) and IADB (2013). 
5 In their survey on development banks Luna-Martinez and Vicente (2012) classify BNDES as a ‘mega-
bank’ together with other large development banks, such as the China Development Bank and 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) from Germany.  
6 A full description of our data sources is presented in Section 3. 
6 
 
associated with the creation of new plants and the enlargement of existing ones, the 
restructuring and the modernization of production processes, innovation and 
technological development. In particular, we consider two measures of productivity: 
‘total factor productivity’ (TFP) and labor productivity. TFP is estimated as the firm-
level Solow residual following the methodology of Levisohn and Petrin (2003).7 It 
measures how effectively a firm transforms a given amount of inputs into output. Labor 
productivity is computed as the ratio of firm value added to number of employees. 
Hence, TFP is closer to the long-term concept of physical efficiency whereas labor 
productivity is more of a short-term concept.8   
Even though there is a growing literature evaluating government policies for 
business support (Bronzini and De Blasio, 2006), there is a relative shortage of papers 
on the specific impact of government policies on private sector development 
(McKenzie, 2010), especially when it comes to firm productivity (see, e.g., Griliches, 
Klette and Moen, 2000; Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen, 2016). This is 
not due to a shortage of methods, since other areas have already developed different 
ways to deal with the issue. An example can be found in the literature in labor 
economics that evaluates to what extent government polices affect individuals’ 
achievements (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999).  
In the case of long-term BNDES loans, the specific chain of causation we want 
to analyse goes from relaxing credit constraints on long-term investment to faster 
productivity growth. Among the relevant categories of long-term investment, the 
literature has mostly been interested in those concerning R&D and innovation. The link 
between innovation and productivity growth is well established, with some recent 
                                                
7 Though the methodology by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is a standard procedure in the TFP estimation 
literature, we provide a description in Appendix VI for completeness.  
8 See Bronzini and De Blasio (2006), Criscuolo et al (2016) and Banerjee and Duflo (2014) for 
assessments in terms of other short-term performance variables such as employment, investment or 
revenue. 
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studies showing that as much as 40% of observed productivity growth can be attributed 
to R&D and innovation (Hall, 2011; Reickard, 2011; Syverson, 2011; Hall and Mohen, 
2013). However, despite extensive research, empirical findings on the effects of 
governments’ innovation programs are still inconclusive, with results varying a lot 
across countries (Gao et al, 2016).9 The role of credit constraints for innovation and 
growth has been stressed mainly in the development literature. Banerjee and Duflo 
(2005) provide evidence that firms in many developing countries face credit constraints, 
using a sample of countries including Brazil. In the specific case of Brazil, Terra (2003), 
Aldrighi and Bisinha (2010) and Ambrozio et al (2017) find evidence of credit 
constraints by investigating the issue at the firm level. More generally, Aghion et al 
(2010) show that tighter credit constraints discourage firms’ long-term investments by 
increasing the corresponding liquidity risk. In the trade literature, there is also evidence 
that credit constraints hamper firms’ efforts to export (Manova, 2013). According to this 
paper, there are three mechanisms through which credit constraints affect trade: 
selection of firms into domestic production; selection of domestic producers into 
exporting; and, last but not least, how much a firm exports. Results show that credit 
constraint affect these three mechanisms, especially at the level of firms’ exports. In the 
case of Brazil, it has been found that exporters face lower credit restriction in the 
Brazilian economy, and even small and middle size firms are not credit constrained if 
they export a relevant part of their sales (Ambrozio et al, 2017). 
BNDES effects on the Brazilian economy have been investigated both in the 
national and the international literature. Recent examples of the latter include the studies 
by Bandeira-de-Mello et al (2015), Carvalho (2014) and Bonono et al (2015). Bandeira-
de-Mello et al (2015) evaluate BNDES loans with reference to a range of firm 
                                                
9 In the case of Latin American countries, Crespi et al (2014) list a number of papers in which innovation 
policies are found to have a positive impact on firm performance.  
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performance indicators, including profitability and investment. Carvalho (2014) 
investigates whether elections shift investments supported by BNDES towards 
politically attractive regions. Bonono et al (2015) study whether BNDES loans affect 
firms’ investment.10 None of these papers, however, assesses the impact of BNDES 
financial support on firms’ productivity growth, which is the focus of our analysis and 
one of BNDES policy targets as we argued above. 
Closer to the spirit of the present paper, Ottaviano and Lage de Sousa (2008) and 
Lage de Sousa (2013) investigate the relationship between firms' performance and 
BNDES loans allocated to the modernization and enlargement of existing plants or to 
the creation of new ones.11 Both papers look only at labor productivity, whereas this 
paper looks also at TFP.  Another feature that distinguishes the present paper is the 
design of an estimation strategy that not only uses different sets of counterfactual 
groups but also tests whether granted firms indeed face tougher credit restriction to start 
with. 
Overall, we find that repeatedly granted firms were more credit constrained than 
comparable non-granted firms before receiving BNDES support. Moreover, with some 
exception, BNDES support did allow granted firms to match the productivity growth of 
similar firms that were not credit constrained to start with, but not to outperform them. 
These findings suggest that government support of the type provided by BNDES may 
indeed help relax credit constraints that prevent constrained firms from performing as 
otherwise identical unconstrained ones. On the other hand, they also suggest that 
BNDES support did not have the effect of making constrained firms select and 
implement their projects more effectively than unconstrained firms.  
                                                
10 For the national literature, see the references in Lage de Sousa and Ottaviano (2014). 
11 Coelho and Lage de Sousa (2010) review all previous studies evaluating the effects of BNDES support, 
including those on productivity. These studies, however, either evaluate BNDES intervention as a whole 
or types of financial support different from the ones we target. 
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 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the financial 
support offered by BNDES to manufacturers. Section 3 introduces the data together 
with the alternative ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups we use to assess the impact of 
BNDES support. Credit constraints are investigated in Section 4, while Section 5 looks 
at the impact of BNDES support on firm productivity. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Overview of BNDES schemes 
 BNDES provides a wide range of financial tools to support Brazilian 
manufacturing firms: FINEM, Automatic BNDES, FINAME, Leasing FINAME, 
International Competition FINAME (BNDES-Exim) and Subscription of Securities. 
BNDES interest rates are subsidized, which means that BNDES reduces firms’ marginal 
cost of investment. We focus on FINEM and Automatic BNDES as these are the most 
important moneywise as well as the most relevant for productivity enhancing long-term 
investments.12  FINEM (‘Financing and Endeavours’) is a support scheme for projects 
with financial needs over 5 million dollars offered by BNDES directly or indirectly 
through retail banks. Projects with financial needs below this threshold are instead 
supported solely indirectly through retail banks under the Automatic BNDES scheme. 
Both schemes contemplate several categories of expenses covering the creation of new 
plants, the enlargement of existing ones, the restructuring and the modernization of 
processes, innovation, and technological development.13 FINEM and Automatic 
                                                
12 See Lage de Sousa and Ottaviano (2014) for a detailed discussion of the other types of BNDES 
financial support; Ribeiro and De Negri (2009) for their effectiveness. Although the other types of 
financial support are less relevant for our purposes, it will be necessary to account for them in order to 
isolate the role of FINEM and Automatic BNDES.    
13 Any type of process and/or product innovation is considered an innovation for BNDES. A concrete 
example of a project supported by FINEM and Automatic BNDES during our period of observation is the 
development of a new dual fuel engine for cars that can run on gasoline or ethanol. BNDES financed not 
only research and engineering but also process implementation at the plant. In this case, BNDES financed 
innovation aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
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BNDES loans are the main types of BNDES financial support, jointly representing 
nearly half of all BNDES resources.14  
  In order to receive FINEM or Automatic BNDES loans, firms need to send a 
supporting application form with some brief information of their projects to a retail 
bank or BNDES itself. The banks evaluate whether the projects are in line with the 
purpose of the loans. After getting their application approved, firms have to send 
complete and detailed project plans for in-depth evaluation in terms of whether they are 
economically viable, what collateral can be used to guarantee the loan, balance sheet 
and other financial information, and so forth.15 All these pieces of information are used 
to determine whether applicants meet the eligibility criteria for selection as beneficiaries 
of BNDES support.  
 If successful, the evaluation process culminates in a formal contract proposal in 
which the terms and conditions of the loan are established, including amount, period, 
and interest rate. After negotiations are completed, the loan contract is signed. It is 
important to note two crucial points here. First, there is an upper limit for BNDES 
participation in any project. This varies over time but is generally around 80%. A 
project is thus never fully financed by BNDES. Second, firms receive their loan in 
instalments according to the development of the project and following a schedule 
decided during negotiation.  
 In particular, firms receive the first instalment when the loan is approved and the 
remaining ones only after an evaluation of the project’s progress. Before the second 
instalment, the firm should prove whether the money of the first disbursement was 
invested as dictated by the project plan. Any violation of the loan terms leads to a 
further investigation and instalments are interrupted until justifications are given. If no 
                                                
14 From 2000 to 2009, FINEM and Automatic BNDES represented on average 46% of the total BNDES 
disbursements. 
15 We will exploit these pieces of information for the construction of the counterfactuals for beneficiaries. 
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problems emerge, instalments continue until the end of the project. Since these are long-
term projects, the period between contract signing and the end of instalments takes on 
average 5 years. Generally, only after all instalments have been paid, firms start 
amortizing their loans. The ‘conditionality’ of instalments to projects’ progress and 
completion implies that granted firms have to invest according to the approved plans so 
that their credit constraints (if they had any) are almost by definition relaxed by 
institutional design. An interesting issue then becomes whether they were credit 
constrained to start with.   
 
3. Treatment and control groups 
 Do FINEM and Automatic BNDES loans help relax credit constraints that 
hamper the productivity of Brazilian manufacturers? We address this question from a 
specific angle investigating what would have happened to the granted firms had they not 
been supported by BNDES but their credit constraints had been nonetheless otherwise 
removed, making them similar ex post to the non-granted non-credit-constrained firms 
in the control group also in this respect.16 Answering this question requires, first of all, 
identifying the group of granted (‘treated’) firms for which enough information is 
available. Then, it is crucial to define a ‘valid’ counterfactual. Compared with the 
counterfactual, one has to establish whether firms granted BNDES loans were indeed 
credit constrained, and then check whether their productivity actually changed 
differentially after receiving the BNDES loans. Checking that they have implemented 
their projects is, instead, redundant given that, as already discussed, BNDES funds are 
                                                
16 This targets the differential effects of BNDES loans with respect to other sources of finance. From an 
alternative angle one could investigate what would have happened to the granted firms had they not been 
supported by BNDES, which would require a comparison group of firms that were not granted but were 
ex ante similar to the granted firms also in terms of credit constraints. We leave this alternative angle to 
future research. 
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transferred to firms in installments and, except for the first one, these are made 
conditional on firms having successfully followed the agreed implementation plan.17 
 Our analysis relies on micro-data drawn from a variety of sources already used 
in the papers described by Coelho and Lage de Sousa (2010). In particular, our dataset 
combines information from: the Annual Industrial Research (Pesquisa Industrial Anual 
– [PIA]) of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística – [IBGE]);18 the Annual Social Information Report (Relação 
Anual de Informações Sociais – [RAIS]) of the Ministry of Labor; the Foreign Trade 
Secretary (Secretaria de Comércio Exterior – [SECEX]) of the Ministry of Industrial 
Development and Foreign Trade; the Foreign Capital Census and the Central Bank 
Register of Brazilian Capital Abroad of the Brazilian Central Bank; BNDES itself.19 
 
3.1 Treatment groups 
We select our ‘treated’ firms as follows. First, we use BNDES data to identify 
granted firms from 1995 to 2007.20 During this period, 756 new firms on average were 
‘treated’ annually in that they received at least once one of the two targeted BNDES 
financial schemes (FINEM and/or Automatic BNDES).21 Nevertheless, it is 
unfortunately impossible to use all these manufacturers as some of them are not 
available from PIA, especially small firms. The reason is that PIA covers only around 
30,000 firms with more than 30 employees. In total, our beneficiaries represent only 
11% of all manufacturers existent in PIA but around 2/3 of overall manufacturing 
                                                
17 This would also make it redundant to check whether granted firms are no more credit constrained after 
receiving BNDES support as long as by design they receive the cash needed to implement their projects.  
18 This survey is our main data source. It contains the majority of the variables useful for this analysis, 
including those needed to measure firm productivity. 
19 The construction of the dataset has followed procedures that guarantee the confidentiality of 
information so that individual data cannot be related to any specific firm. 
20 Data on 1995 are used only to exclude any firm that received ‘financial treatment’ in that particular 
year. Data on 2007 are used to choose one of the counterfactual groups, as described later in the paper. 
21 More precisely, 9,828 firms were granted during these 11 years. 
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employment.22 Hence, the fact that we have to focus only on PIA firms reduces the 
number of firms granted in our sample by half.  Third, the size of the ‘treated’ group is 
further reduced because we want to evaluate only the productivity of manufacturing 
firms granted loans to implement projects in the manufacturing sector. BNDES records, 
however, concern all manufacturing projects. They thus report also manufacturing 
projects by non-manufacturing firms (e.g., those of large food retailers investing in the 
development of their own brands) and do not cover non-manufacturing projects of 
manufacturing firms (e.g., those implemented in agriculture). Fourth, some firms appear 
or disappear from records due to mergers. For example, if Firm A received a loan in 
1997 and in 2000 merged with Firm B creating a new Firm C, the initial loan should be 
registered for firm C. As the past records of Firm C are impossible to reconstruct, we 
drop all information on loans projects granted to firms like A and B.23 Finally, there is a 
time lag of generally two to three years before a firm enters the Census part of PIA.24 
Hence, some granted firms with more than 30 employees are not recorded by PIA at the 
moment they receive BNDES loans. 
Further issues potentially affect the size of our ‘treated’ group. Some firms are 
exposed to other government interventions apart from BNDES loans. Since BNDES is 
the largest financial institution in Brazil offering loans for long-term projects, we 
assume that its loans are the main type of policy tools affecting firms’ productivity. In 
addition, there may be a time lag for any impact to be detected, since outcomes do not 
necessarily appear immediately after the loans have been granted or arguably before 
                                                
22 Firms with less than 30 employees are also considered by PIA, but they are selected randomly for the 
survey each year. Since their sample varies annually, and is thus impossible to follow, we have decided to 
discard them. As we will show in Section 3.2.1, BNDES beneficiaries tend to be larger firms. See 
Bonomo et al (2015) for further analysis on this particular issue. 
23 All firms that have received financial support through Subscription of Securities are deleted from our 
sample as our focus is on firms implementing projects. Moreover, only a very limited number of firms 
have received support through Subscription of Securities, which does not provide enough information for 
any econometric investigation. 
24 IBGE receives information on firms’ size (number of employees) for a particular year only at the end of 
the following year. 
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they are fully implemented. As some projects last at least five years, we need a period 
beyond the five-year horizon to assess their impacts not only during but also after 
implementation. Given the time spanned by our dataset (1996 to 2006), that is clearly 
not feasible for loans granted from 1999 onwards. On the other hand, as we will discuss 
later, to construct the ‘control’ group for firms treated in a certain year, one needs at 
least two years before treatment. Hence, only for firms granted Automatic BNDES and 
FINEM loans in 1998 the impacts of these BNDES schemes can be scrutinized both 
during implementation (from 1998 to 2003) and after implementation (from 2004 to 
2006).25 Excluding all firms treated before 1998 leaves us with 227 firms which have 
received the first loan in this specific year (1998).26 Among these, 86 firms are not 
present in the PIA dataset for the whole period investigated.27 In the end, we have two 
initial ‘treated’ groups: 141 firms and 227 firms, Groups 1 and 2 listed in Table 1, 
depending on whether we focus only on ‘survivors’ or not. 
Table 1: Number of Treated Firms in 1998 
Group Name Description Survived? Number of Firms 
Group 1 
Firms granted for the 1st time in 1998 
Yes 141 
Group 2 No 227 
Group 3 
Firms granted only in1998 
Yes 75 
Group 4 No 143 
Group 5 
Firms granted only Automatic BNDES 
Yes 112 
Group 6 No 190 
 
                                                
25 Targeting only projects of which the possible impacts can be monitored both during and after 
implementation (rather than also projects for which monitoring is possible only during implementation) 
limits the size of the treated groups, and thus the power to detect those impacts. Nevertheless, we have 
made this choice because full implementation is what is assumed at the project selection stage, and thus 
the impacts of fully implemented projects are arguably what BNDES support should be eventually held 
accountable for. Ottaviano and Lage de Sousa (2008) and Lage de Sousa (2013) look only at the effects 
during implementation (and, as pointed out in the Introduction, only in terms of labor productivity) with 
treatment year 1997. Their findings are consistent with the ones in the present paper.     
26 Considering that on average 756 firms receive BNDES financial support per year, our reduced sample 
to 227 firms does not seem to be exceedingly small, especially once we consider that only around half of 
the granted firms (circa 378 firms) are available in PIA, our main dataset for productivity estimation. 
27 There are three possible explanations for why a firm leaves the PIA dataset: first, it goes bankrupt; 
second, its employment level falls short of the threshold of 30 employees; third, the main part of its 
revenue does not come anymore from manufacturing. 
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On the other hand, it may be useful to further distinguish the firms in these 
‘treated’ groups. First, to see whether there are any differential impacts between FINEM 
and Automatic BNDES, we consider firms that have received only Automatic BNDES 
whether surviving (Group 5) or not (Group 6). Second, to investigate the effects of non-
repeated treatment, we also trim our sample to firms that were awarded BNDES support 
only in 1998 and not afterwards, whether surviving (Group 3) or not (Group 4). 28 
 
3.2. Control groups 
As highlighted above, we want to investigate what would have happened to the 
granted firms had they not been supported by BNDES but still their credit constraints 
had been otherwise removed. How can we build a ‘valid’ counterfactual for the selected 
groups of ‘treated’ firms? Short of natural experiments or randomized control trials, the 
answer is not straightforward. We, therefore, try various alternatives in order to control 
for observable as well as unobservable characteristics using our judgement to identify 
‘control’ groups that are likely to share similar pre-treatment characteristics with the 
‘treated’ ones. Clearly, for the specific purpose of our investigation, credit constraints 
should not be part of the pre-treatment characteristics we consider and this is made 
possible by the fact that eligibility to BNDES funding does not require firms to prove 
they face any credit constraint to start with. We will thus be able to compare ex post 
‘treated’ and ‘non-treated’ firms that are ex ante similar in several key dimensions apart 
from credit constraints.    
  
                                                
28 We have also investigated different treated groups (such as firms financed through Automatic BNDES 
only in 1998), but results were similar to those presented for the chosen treated groups. 
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3.2.1. Granted versus non-granted 
The first naïve control group (Group A) consists of all 21,380 Brazilian firms 
(above 30 employees) that did not receive any BNDES loans during the period of 
analysis. Firms, however, are not randomly selected by BNDES and systematic 
differences between granted and non-granted firms do exist. Table 2 summarizes the 
main characteristics of granted and non-granted firms before BNDES intervention.29 
First, credit constraints seem indeed to be stricter for ‘treated’ than ‘non-treated’ firms: 
whereas cash flow over capital is lower for the former than the latter, the reverse holds 
for the investment rate (investment over capital). While this is consistent with ‘treated’ 
firms facing stricter constraints, it may also be due to the fact that granted firms are 
more present in riskier sectors, as evidenced by the OECD technological classification.  
Table 2: Average of Granted and Non-Granted Firms One Year Before Treatment 
Groups Non-Granted Firms Granted Firms 
Variables 
All Firms over 30 
employees 
All First Time 
in 1998 
Automatic BNDES 
1st Time 1998 
All only in 
1998 
Labor Productivity 26.6 35.5 29.7 31.8 
Labor Productivity Growth 30.3% 31.7% 27.6% 34.6% 
TFP Levinhson-Petrin 100 115 107 106 
TFP Growth -3.2% 0.5% -1.6% 0.0% 
Number of Employees 175 620 332 468 
Investment / Capital 3.7% 6.6% 6.9% 5.5% 
Cash Flow / Capital 12.3% 10.5% 10.4% 11.2% 
Export Status 32.2% 58.9% 54.5% 49.3% 
OCDE Classification   
High & Medium-High Tech 22% 32% 32% 35% 
Low & Medium-Low Tech 78% 68% 68% 65% 
Number of Firms 21,380 141 112 75 
* All values from 1997 
 
Turning to productivity, on average ‘treated’ firms are larger and tend to exhibit 
higher productivity. This is so in terms of both total factor productivity (TFP) and labor 
productivity (value added per worker), though the difference is more pronounced for the 
latter. While the labor productivity of firms granted for the first time in 1998 is more 
                                                
29 Descriptive statistics for the variables in Table 2 can be found in Table A.2 in Appendix II. Variable 
descriptions and sources are reported in Table A.1 in Appendix I. Similar results are obtained with non-
surviving firms (Groups 2, 4 and 6). 
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than 30% higher than that of non-granted firms, the TFP of the former is only 2.6% 
higher than that of the latter. Compared with the period before treatment, both measures 
of productivity grow faster for treated than non-treated firms. 
 
3.2.2. Observable characteristics 
Differences shown in the previous section suggest a presence of selection bias. 
By minimizing the differences between ‘treated’ and ‘non-treated’ groups in terms of 
the observable characteristics shown in Table 2, our intention is to reduce this selection 
bias. In so doing we use a ‘mixture’ of caliper and one-to-one Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM).30. In pure caliper, matched and non-matched firms are selected with a 
tolerance defined by the investigator and with replacement. In pure one-to-one PSM, 
firms are selected as the closest matches without replacement. We ‘mix’ the two 
approaches, finding for each treated firm the closest non-treated match without 
replacement but also imposing a similarity threshold (with tolerance at the 2nd decimal). 
This method creates a counterfactual group by pairing each granted firm with a similar 
non-granted one. Treated firms that cannot be paired with any non-granted firm are 
discarded. 
Ideally, to avoid any selection bias, for our specific purposes one would like to 
compare granted credit-constrained firms with non-granted non-credit-constrained, yet 
eligible, firms. First, as our dataset allows for the observation of the characteristics of 
firms that BNDES actually uses to evaluate applications, we can exploit such 
characteristics. However, characteristics other than those used by BNDES may affect 
firm productivity growth., To reduce the possible implied bias, as suggested by 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Heinrich, Maffioli and Vasquez (2010), we also 
                                                
30 See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) as well as Heinrich, Maffioli and Vazquez (2010) for further details 
on how to implement a PSM. See also Arnold and Javornik (2005) for an example of paper using PSM to 
evaluate the impact of foreign investment on firm productivity in Indonesia. 
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check whether beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries differ in terms of other observable 
characteristics, related to firm productivity but different from those relevant for 
eligibility. Furthermore, there is the issue that unobserved characteristics may drive the 
decision to apply as well as any ensuing differential productivity growth for granted 
firms. In this respect, Caliendo, Mahlstet and Mitnick (2014) argue that the 
unobservable bias can be reduced by increasing the number of covariates. In addition to 
that, for the evaluation of BNDES effects on productivity we also adopt difference-in-
differences conditional on variables that might affect productivity. Finally, as eligibility 
to BNDES funding does not require applicants to prove they are actually credit 
constrained, a correct interpretation of results calls for a preliminary check that firms in 
the treatment groups are indeed more credit constrained than firms in the corresponding 
control groups before treatment.  
As for eligibility criteria, these are unsurprisingly related to the various 
dimensions through which the lender can try to assess the borrower’s ability to repay 
the loans. A first type of indicator of this ability is the availability of collateral. As firms 
generally collateralize tangible assets, we measure the availability of collateral through 
firm capital stock. A second type of indicators relies on the availability of cash flow, 
which we measure through: revenues; profit over total sales; the ratio of financial costs 
minus financial revenue to total revenue (‘solvency’); and the number of employees as a 
proxy for firm size alternative to revenue. To control for pre-treatment time trends that 
Arraiz et al (2014) and Castillo et al (2014) have shown to differ between granted and 
non-granted firms, we also include the growth rates of revenue, profit and employment. 
Other indicators considered by BNDES are firms’ market share, multinational status 
and location in terms of whether firms are located in the most developed (‘rich’) regions 
of Brazil. These are the South and the Southeast, which jointly represent nearly 85% of 
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Brazilian manufacturing production. Multinational status and location are captured 
through dummies. Finally, a sectoral dummy is introduced to account for the fact that 
the BNDES operational structure is divided by sectors.    
To identify the indicators that are indeed associated with successful BNDES 
applications, we use a Probit model in which the outcome is the ex-ante probability of 
success. The corresponding results are shown in Table 3 for treated Group 1 as defined 
in Table 1.31 All estimated coefficients significantly different from zero have the 
expected positive sign and the model exhibits reasonable fit, as shown by the percentage 
of concordance and the Hosmer and Lemeshow Statistic. In particular, performing well 
pre-treatment (in terms of employment and profit) increases a firm’s probability of 
being supported. Firm size is also important in terms of both the number of employees 
and revenue. The capital stock matters too when entered together with the number of 
employees. It is instead insignificant when entered together with revenue. A possible 
explanation is its weaker correlation with the former than the latter. 
  
                                                
31 For parsimony, we present only results related to treatment Group 1. Results for the other treatment 
groups are available upon request. 
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Table 3: Probit Model Results 
Probit Model Employees Revenues 
Dependent Variable: BNDES Dummy (i) (ii) 
Capital Stock 0.08 0.06 
(0.04)** (0.04) 
Number Employees 0.17 
(0.06)*** 
Revenue 0.15 
(0.05)*** 
Solvency -0.96 -0.86 
(0.85) (0.84) 
Profit -0.58 -0.71 
(0.54) (0.55) 
Profit Growth 0.07 0.08 
(0.04)* (0.04)* 
Employees Growth 0.28 0.38 
(0.16)* (0.16)** 
Revenue Growth -0.10 -0.17 
(0.14) (0.14) 
Market Share 190.87 182.76 
(87.14)** (87.58)* 
Multinational Status -0.10 -0.17 
(0.14) (0.14) 
Rich Region 0.14 0.12 
(0.13) (0.13) 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 5.550 5.550 
Percent Concordant 76% 76.2% 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Statistic (p-value) 0.86 0.74 
 
We can now pair granted and non-granted firms with similar ex-ante probability 
of being funded (PSM). We start looking for matches at the seventh decimal digit of 
probability. For unmatched firms we gradually relax the requirement until the second 
decimal digit. Granted firms that at that point cannot find a non-granted match are 
dropped.32 Starting with all non-granted firms, we find six different ‘control’ groups 
depending on each ‘treated’ group. A summary of how many firms are matched is 
shown in Table 4. More than 70% of treated firms find their non-treated ‘twin’.33 
                                                
32 More information on PSM results are presented in Appendix III. 
33 Instead of our PSM, we could have used other types of PSM (such as one-to-many or Kernel). These 
alternatives would have increased the number of matched non-granted firms. They would have reduced, 
however, the quality of matches. Given that through our PSM more than 70% of treated firms find their 
non-treated ‘twin’, we have preferred to favour match quality. Moreover, Kernel matching is used by 
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Table 4: Number of Matched Firms 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
Treated Matched 118 169 65 108 99 144 
Treated Not Matched 23 58 10 35 13 46 
Percentage Matched 84% 74% 87% 76% 88% 76% 
 
Table 5 illustrates the extent to which matched pairs are similar in terms of the 
observable characteristics selected through the Probit model. It reports averages for 
these characteristics as well as t-statistics and p-values for the test of mean difference 
between matched pairs.34 While in the Probit regression all continuous variables are in 
logs, the averages and the tests of means in Table 5 are in levels, which makes the 
comparison more telling than in logs as this reduces the variability of variables for 
matching while allowing it to be larger when testing for balancing. 
 
 
Table 5: Comparing Firms after Matching 
  Non-Treated Treated Testing Matched Firms 
  Not Matched Matched Matched Not Matched t Value P-value 
Capital Stock 19 53 66 179 -0.55 58.0% 
Number of Employees 192 420 526 1.102 -1.03 30.2% 
Solvency 3.0% 2.5% 2.7% 3.2% -0.44 66.0% 
Profit 6.7% 6.2% 6.4% 2.0% -0.20 84.3% 
Profit Growth 49% 82% 38% 125% 1.78 7.8% 
Employment Growth 4% 5% 8% 14% -0.71 47.6% 
Revenue Growth 21% 21% 20% 7% 0.18 85.7% 
Market Share 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.9% -1.61 11.0% 
Multinational Status 8% 11% 16% 9% -1.14 25.6% 
Rich 87% 87% 89% 83% -0.40 68.9% 
Labor Productivity 26.8 30.3 35.1 37.6 -1.21 22.7% 
TFP Productivity 101.7 97.1 97.1 103.3 0.04 96.6% 
Investment 2.3 5.6 11.9 33.5 -1.41 16.0% 
Cash Flow / Capital 16.8% 10.6% 10.4% 11.4% 0.14 88.8% 
Investment / Capital 4.0% 4.3% 6.8% 6% -3.23 0.2% 
Number of Firms 6.226 118 118 23     
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Lage de Sousa (2013), who investigates the effects of our BNDES schemes during (but not after) 
implementation. His findings are consistent with ours. 
34For parsimony, in the main text we present only results related to treatment Group 1. Results for the 
other treatment groups are available in Appendix III. 
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In general, treated and non-treated firms are much more alike in Table 5 than in 
Table 2. At the 5% level of significance nearly all averages do not exhibit any 
statistically difference. Most notably, this happens not only for the eligibility-related 
variables selected through the Probit model, but also for key additional variables (labor 
productivity, TFP, and cash flow to capital) not included in that model because of their 
irrelevance for eligibility. As our aim is to measure the impact of BNDES loans on the 
productivity of beneficiaries, for our purposes it is important that matched firms exhibit 
similar productivity levels before treatment even though productivity is not used to 
match them. The same holds for the ratio of cash flow to capital. In this respect, one 
may argue that, although the investment level remains higher for granted than non-
granted firms and overall they still look more credit constrained, their ability to generate 
funds for investment has become more alike after PSM. 
 
3.2.3. Unobservable characteristics 
Although beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are fairly similar in terms of 
observable characteristics after PSM, differences in terms of unobservable 
characteristics might still exist so that the problem of selection bias persists. We deal 
with time-invariant unobservable characteristics by estimating the impact by difference-
in-differences (more details in Section 5). Then we are left with time-variant 
unobservable characteristics that might distort our results. Management quality or the 
capability to generate projects, for instance, are unobservable characteristics that might 
change over time, especially due to different circumstances faced by firms, such as 
increased competition or macroeconomic shocks. In order to tackle this issue, we use 
some observable facts that might affect those unobservable time-variant characteristics. 
This allows us to design additional control groups to be used for robustness checks.  
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There are three observable facts that can be used for this purpose: investment, 
survival and ability to access BNDES funds. First, as granted firms are among those 
interested in making investments, we consider the group of all non-granted firms that 
during the investigated period have both invested and survived. This provides us with a 
group of firms (Group B) that have managed to invest and remain active during the 
whole period we investigate, therefore having, for instance, similar management quality 
and capability to generate projects to those of granted firms. There are 6,344 such firms. 
Still, for unobservable reasons, these non-granted firms might still not be eligible for 
BNDES financial support. To deal with this issue, we consider another refined group 
composed by the firms that did receive BNDES loans but not during the investigated 
period. The logic behind this is that one may argue that these firms were likely to be 
eligible for BNDES support during our investigated period but did not apply. 
Specifically, given that the information we use to test whether BNDES financial support 
had any impact begins in 1996 and ends in 2006, we place in the refined group (Group 
C) all firms granted in 2007 for the first time. There are 128 of them. It is important to 
stress that firms in Group C are contained also in Groups A and B, and firms in Group B 
also belong to Group A. In other words, our controls groups A, B and C are labelled in 
increasing order of refinement.35 
Now that we have identified the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups, we are ready 
to check: whether granted firms are indeed relatively credit constrained before receiving 
BNDES support; and then how their productivity growth compares with that of other 
otherwise similar non-granted non-credit constrained firms after receiving BNDES 
support. 
 
                                                
35 Descriptive Statistics for Groups B and C compared with other control and treated groups are available 
in Table A.2 in Appendix II. 
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4. Are granted firms more credit constrained before ‘treatment’? 
We investigate credit constraints by looking at the correlation between firms’ 
investment and cash flows.36 The underlying idea (we already used to comment on 
Tables 2 and 5) is that, when firms are credit constrained, investment has to rely on own 
liquidity thus leading to a positive correlation between investment and cash flow 
(Fazzari et al 1988). This measure has been criticized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
among others and alternative approaches have been proposed in the literature, such as 
that by Almeida et al (2004).37 This approach, however, requires information on how 
much cash each firm has, which unfortunately is not available in our dataset. On the 
other hand, recent papers following Fazzari et al (1988) -- such as Carpenter and 
Guariglia (2008), Guariglia (2008) and Guariglia et al (2011) -- show that their idea is 
still valid for the purpose of investigating credit constraints, especially when 
information needed to implement other approaches is not available.  
Specifically, we test for the presence of credit constraints that are particularly 
relevant for granted firms by running the following regression: 
 
Invit/Kit-1 = β(CashFlowit/Kit-1) + α(CashFlowit/Kit-1)*BNDESi + γXit + εit  (1) 
 
where i identifies the firm and t denotes the year, Invit is the level of investment, Kit-1 is 
the capital stock, CashFlowit is the amount of cash flow generated, BNDESi is a dummy 
for ‘treated’ firms, Xit is a set of controls and εit is the error term. As the capital stock is 
lagged in time, this specification requires two-period information and, as our treated 
group includes firms granted in 1998, we are restricted to use information from 1996 
and 1997. We are thus able to estimate this specification only with OLS in the cross 
                                                
36 See Aldrighi and Bisinha (2010), Ambrozio et al (2013), and Terra (2003) for other papers 
investigating credit restriction using Brazilian firm-level data. 
37 See Ambrozio et al (2013) for additional details. 
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section. In order to eliminate as much as possible firm specific characteristics, we 
introduce different sets of dummies, including OECD technological classification, size, 
region and multinational status, as well as current and lagged sales over capital. For 
investment opportunities, we follow the literature by including sectoral value added 
variation and investment. The parameter of interest is α. A significant positive estimate 
would mean that, before receiving BNDES support in 1998, granted firms in treated 
groups faced indeed stricter credit constraints than non-granted firms in control groups. 
 Table 6 reports the estimation results based on equation (1) for treated Group 1. 
Columns correspond to the different counterfactuals. Since the coefficient of cash flow 
interacted with the BNDES dummy is positive and significant in all entries, the table 
shows that granted firms are indeed more credit constrained than all control groups 
before being awarded BNDES financial support. These findings are confirmed also in 
the case of firms granted Automatic BNDES, but not for those granted only once.38 This 
means that firms that requested BNDES financial support only once were not more 
credit constrained whereas those that requested it more than once were. Such divergence 
suggests that repeated treatment can indeed be considered as a marker of a firm being 
more credit constrained while single treatment cannot. This will enable us to provide a 
more nuanced picture of how BNDES loans affect relative firm performance depending 
on the number of treatments. 
  
                                                
38 Results for other groups are available in Appendix IV. 
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Table 6: Credit Restriction for Group 1 
Dependent Variable: Invest / K Group A Group B Group C Paired Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cash Flow / K 0.000816*** 0.000436 -0.00704 0.0508 
 (0.00041) (0.00110) (0.0159) (0.0394) 
BNDES * Cash Flow / K 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.120** 
 (0.0302) (0.03) (0.0419) (0.0532) 
Sales / K -0.00029*** -0.000413*** -0.00124 -0.0247*** 
 (3.45e-05) (0.000158) (0.00355) (0.00721) 
Sales / K lagged in time 0.000352*** 0.000290*** 0.000518*** 0.0168*** 
 (1.96e-05) (2.44e-05) (0.000188) (0.00406) 
OCDE Tech. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multinational Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18.104 6.485 271 216 
R-squared 0.111 0.132 0.215 0.181 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5. How do granted firms compare with non-granted firms after ‘treatment’?  
After checking that, before accessing BNDES funds, repeatedly granted firms 
faced more severe credit constraints than non-granted ones, we can now investigate 
whether BNDES support affected their subsequent relative performance. We do this 
through a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to eliminate time-invariant 
unobservable characteristics that are different between ‘treated’ and ‘non-treated’ firms. 
In particular, we adopt the specification in Bronzini and De Blasio (2006): 
yit = β BNDESi + ∑t αt Dt + ∑t  δt (BNDESi . POSTt) + Xit γ + εit    (2) 
 
where ity  is a productivity measure, BNDESi is a dummy variable indicating granted 
firms, Dt is a year dummy, POSTt  is a set of dummies for each year after the firm 
received the loan, and Xit is the vector of control variables. The parameter of interest is 
δt: its estimated value measures the differential impact of BNDES support on firm 
productivity in a given year. Note that the estimation of (2) allows us to assess not only 
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whether BNDES support affects firm productivity in general, but also when its impact 
eventually materializes. 
Table 7 presents the estimation results using treatment Groups 1 and 2. Control 
groups are Group A and paired firms through PSM (‘Paired’). Columns of each 
counterfactual group are divided into two types of productivity measures: labor 
productivity and total factor productivity (TFP).39 
 
Table 7: Results of Difference-in-Differences (More than Once) 
Treated Group Group 1 Group 2 
Control Group Group A Paired Group A Paired 
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP 
Effect in 1998 0.130** 0.00176 0.103 0.00371 0.0562 0.00904 0.0531 -0.000451 
(0.0577) (0.00870) (0.102) (0.00319) (0.0625) (0.00845) (0.0951) (0.00176) 
Effect in 1999 0.150*** -0.00273 0.0940 0.00188 0.0922 0.00208 0.0838 -0.00264 
(0.0549) (0.00916) (0.0983) (0.00291) (0.0573) (0.00993) (0.129) (0.00181) 
Effect in 2000 0.181*** -0.0853 0.194 0.00112 0.124* -0.0829 0.0589 -0.00167 
(0.0562) (0.0714) (0.118) (0.00286) (0.0665) (0.0700) (0.122) (0.00115) 
Effect in 2001 0.163*** -0.0115 0.195* 0.00101 0.137*** -0.00943 -0.00842 -0.00216* 
(0.0589) (0.0109) (0.119) (0.00278) (0.0513) (0.0108) (0.0757) (0.00115) 
Effect in 2002 0.169*** -0.0165* 0.0724 0.00245 0.126** -0.0136 0.0906 -0.00113 
(0.0567) (0.00976) (0.0736) (0.00285) (0.0495) (0.00982) (0.0848) (0.00126) 
Effect in 2003 0.126** -0.0117 0.104 0.000838 0.0703 -0.00960 0.0553 -0.00198* 
(0.0529) (0.0103) (0.0743) (0.00276) (0.0500) (0.0114) (0.0865) (0.00113) 
Effect in 2004 0.0993* -0.0269** 0.0918 -0.000126 0.0424 -0.0259** 0.0638 -0.00217* 
(0.0583) (0.0125) (0.0760) (0.00309) (0.0537) (0.0131) (0.0910) (0.00120) 
Effect in 2005 0.0573 -0.0300* 0.0717 -6.61e-05 0.0176 -0.0289* 0.0282 -0.00317** 
(0.0587) (0.0164) (0.0763) (0.00307) (0.0515) (0.0168) (0.0856) (0.00151) 
Effect in 2006 0.0122 -0.0528*** 0.0789 0.000593 -0.0216 -0.0516*** -0.0242 -0.00248** 
(0.0581) (0.0174) (0.0744) (0.00276) (0.0516) (0.0179) (0.0800) (0.00125) 
Multiple Treatments 0.00255 0.0129*** 0.0120 0.000218 0.0182** 0.0137*** 0.0315*** 0.000259** 
(0.00802) (0.00403) (0.0102) (0.000148) (0.00882) (0.00431) (0.00969) (0.000121) 
Domestic Capital 0.0194*** -0.0217   0.0190***   -0.0156 
(0.00450) (0.0301)   (0.00450)   (0.0326) 
Imported Capital 0.0181** 0.0529**   0.0189**   0.0357 
  (0.00904)   (0.0225)   (0.00906)   (0.0360)   
Observations 203.418 175.963 2.336 2.317 203.943 176.488 2.703 2.689 
R-squared 0.693 0.481 0.779 0.495 0.694 0.481 0.754 0.547 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As the TFP measure accounts for differences in capital stock among firms, the 
corresponding regressions do not feature investment in either domestic capital or 
                                                
39 Outcomes for treated Groups 5 and 6 are very similar to those for Groups 1 and 2 when estimating for 
control Groups A and Paired. Results are available in Appendix V, together with expanded versions of the 
tables shown in this section including all covariates. 
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imported capital as a covariate.40 These are, instead, included in the case of labor 
productivity. Interestingly, investment in imported capital and labor productivity are 
positively correlated while no clear cut correlation appears in the case of domestic 
capital. This may suggest that imported capital goods are technologically more 
advanced. 
As for our parameter of interest, in the case of labor productivity results are 
mixed depending on control groups. In our least refined control group (Groups A), we 
find a positive impact of BNDES support on labor productivity until 2004 for treatment 
Group 1 and until 2002 for treatment Group 2. Nonetheless, no effect is evidenced 
afterwards, suggesting that loans improve the relative performance of granted firms for 
seven or five years, depending on the treatment group. However, this does not happen 
when we consider the most refined control groups (Paired). Compared to these groups, 
‘treated’ firms do not perform any different.  
Results are not mixed in the case of TFP, in which no effect of BNDES support 
is detected in the first years after ‘treated’ firms are granted whatever comparison group 
is considered. From 2003, BNDES financial support consistently impacts negatively 
granted firms when compared with non-granted firms in the least refined control Group 
A no matter whether treated firms survived or not. This holds also for granted firms in 
the Paired control group when the treated group includes non-survivors (Group 2) but 
ceases to hold when the treated group consists of survivors only (Group 1). As the most 
refined comparison between treated Group 1 and control group Paired reveals no 
differential effect of treatment in terms of both labor productivity and TFP, we conclude 
that in our sample there is no strong evidence that BNDES support differentially affects 
firm productivity growth. 
                                                
40 We also tried including them but results remained qualitatively similar. 
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As in Table 7 the number of treatments is positively correlated with firms’ 
productivity, it is relevant to investigate BNDES effects on firms granted only once.41 
Table 8 shows outcomes for treatment Groups 3 and 4, which are those supported by 
BNDES only in 1998 and no more until the end of our investigated period (2006). The 
effects of loans on firms’ productivity become less evident for these groups. The 
positive effect on labor productivity vanishes completely and independently of which 
control group is considered, from the most naïve (Group A) to the most refined (Paired). 
This shows that granted firms tend to perform similarly to other firms not only while 
projects are being implemented but also after their full implementation. In terms of TFP, 
a negative impact occurs at the end of our investigated period (last two years: 2005 and 
2006), yet only when granted firms are compared with the most naïve control group 
(Group A). The effect disappears completely in the case of paired firms.  
  
                                                
41 We also estimated the model using two strategies for multiple treatments. First, we introduced two 
dummies: one for firms financed twice to four times; another for firms financed five times or more. 
Second, we introduced a dummy for each multiple treatment: one for double treatment, another for triple 
treatment, and so on. All estimations remained similar to those we report and are available upon request. 
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Table 8: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Just Once) 
Treated Group Group 3 Group 4 
Control Group Group A Paired Group A Paired 
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP 
Effect in 1998 0.0261 0.0194** 0.00939 -0.0165 0.0493 0.0119 0.113 -0.000821 
(0.0822) (0.00868) (0.104) (0.0174) (0.0902) (0.0109) (0.135) (0.00237) 
Effect in 1999 0.0508 0.00920 -0.0456 -0.00399 0.0763 0.00202 0.0163 -0.00253 
(0.0722) (0.00931) (0.103) (0.00354) (0.0821) (0.0121) (0.158) (0.00253) 
Effect in 2000 0.0432 -0.0759 -0.0694 -0.000177 0.0730 -0.0825 -0.0322 -0.00112 
(0.0972) (0.0724) (0.109) (0.00291) (0.1000) (0.0706) (0.163) (0.00135) 
Effect in 2001 0.0752 -0.00510 -0.0422 -0.00177 0.108 -0.0111 -0.0578 -0.00149 
(0.0559) (0.0101) (0.112) (0.00293) (0.0721) (0.0123) (0.105) (0.00137) 
Effect in 2002 0.0710 -0.0106 0.0728 -5.14e-05 0.109 -0.0159 0.0471 0.000458 
(0.0510) (0.00908) (0.103) (0.00304) (0.0681) (0.0116) (0.117) (0.00166) 
Effect in 2003 0.0608 -0.000425 0.121 -0.000950 0.102 -0.00522 0.142 -0.000398 
(0.0516) (0.0121) (0.103) (0.00273) (0.0668) (0.0144) (0.118) (0.00135) 
Effect in 2004 0.0246 -0.0204 0.168 5.31e-05 0.0702 -0.0244 0.0938 -0.000715 
(0.0589) (0.0127) (0.117) (0.00289) (0.0713) (0.0157) (0.125) (0.00148) 
Effect in 2005 0.0122 -0.0272* 0.117 0.001000 0.0626 -0.0305* 0.0483 -0.00234 
(0.0498) (0.0153) (0.112) (0.00301) (0.0652) (0.0180) (0.107) (0.00201) 
Effect in 2006 -0.0647 -0.0535*** 0.0128 -0.00271 -0.0138 -0.0567*** 0.0195 -0.000935 
(0.0567) (0.0165) (0.117) (0.00291) (0.0709) (0.0187) (0.115) (0.00151) 
Domestic Capital 0.0196*** -0.0182   0.0196***   0.0855* 
(0.00450) (0.0300)   (0.00450)   (0.0491) 
Imported Capital 0.0186** 0.000187   0.0187**   0.0627 
  (0.00907)   (0.0319)   (0.00907)   (0.0451)   
Observations 203.128 175.677 1.203 1.189 203.150 175.696 1.674 1.661 
R-squared 0.693 0.11 0.870 0.191 0.693 0.481 0.761 0.391 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The existence of unobserved time-variant characteristics, which are not 
considered in the previous estimations, might be interfering in the overall results. As a 
robustness check, we estimate the effect of these schemes using the two control groups 
described in Section 4: non-granted firms that have both invested and survived (Group 
B) and, among those, all firms granted in 2007 for the first time (Group C). As these 
control groups include only surviving firms, we consider only granted firms that have 
also survived during the investigated period: treatment Groups 1, 3 and 5. Table 9 
shows the results. Columns present a similar structure as in previous tables and, while 
different control groups are used, the message remains basically the same. A positive 
impact on labor productivity occurs in all three treated groups when we use the less 
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refined control Group B but disappears when we look at the more refined control Group 
C. Once more, there is little evidence that BNDES support differentially affects firm 
productivity growth also after controlling for the existence of unobserved time-variant 
characteristics. 
 These findings are not an isolated case in the literature. For example, Criscuolo 
et al (2016) investigate the effect of industrial policy in the UK. Their results show no 
significant impact on firms’ productivity, even though there are effects on employment 
and investment. Arraiz et al (2014) evaluate the effects of government-backed partial 
credit guarantees on firms’ performance in Colombia. Although they find some impact 
on output and employment, no effect is found on productivity. Similar outcomes are 
also reported by other papers listed in Coelho and Lage de Sousa (2010), including 
Ottaviano and Lage de Sousa (2008) and Lage de Sousa (2013). These last two papers 
investigate the same BNDES schemes as we do here but use different empirical 
strategies and a different granted year (1997), which suggests that our results may hold 
regardless of the year investigated. Given that Lage de Sousa (2013) use Kernel 
matching strategy, our results also seem robust across different matching strategies. 
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Table 9: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Robustness Check - unobservable time-variant characteristics) 
Treated Group Group 1 Group 3 Group 5 
Control Group Group B Group C Group B Group C Group B Group C 
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP 
Effect in 1998 0.0943* 0.0162 0.180 0.0211 0.129 0.0173 0.230 0.0197 0.105 0.0217 0.189 0.0239 
(0.0565) (0.0451) (0.156) (0.0649) (0.0865) (0.0648) (0.168) (0.0791) (0.0647) (0.0497) (0.158) (0.0684) 
Effect in 1999 0.109** -0.0210 0.0303 -0.0227 0.133* -0.0159 0.0578 -0.0279 0.121** -0.0196 0.0444 -0.0215 
(0.0533) (0.0431) (0.123) (0.0609) (0.0802) (0.0608) (0.137) (0.0735) (0.0594) (0.0456) (0.126) (0.0626) 
Effect in 2000 0.130** -0.0185 0.0742 -0.0383 0.106 -0.0333 0.0461 -0.0676 0.146** -0.0266 0.0845 -0.0457 
(0.0550) (0.0442) (0.158) (0.0613) (0.0854) (0.0621) (0.172) (0.0746) (0.0595) (0.0472) (0.160) (0.0631) 
Effect in 2001 0.128** -0.0276 0.281 0.00854 0.0971 -0.0568 0.258 -0.0335 0.127** -0.0375 0.281 0.000887 
(0.0574) (0.0415) (0.199) (0.0587) (0.0891) (0.0603) (0.210) (0.0730) (0.0614) (0.0461) (0.201) (0.0617) 
Effect in 2002 0.153*** 0.0224 0.182 0.0121 0.135 0.0168 0.175 -0.00557 0.141** 0.00287 0.167 -0.0108 
(0.0550) (0.0442) (0.130) (0.0624) (0.0845) (0.0650) (0.146) (0.0774) (0.0612) (0.0492) (0.132) (0.0656) 
Effect in 2003 0.123** -0.0284 -0.0456 -0.0402 0.141* -0.0391 -0.0240 -0.0647 0.102* -0.0347 -0.0727 -0.0507 
(0.0511) (0.0450) (0.106) (0.0606) (0.0779) (0.0630) (0.122) (0.0741) (0.0590) (0.0500) (0.110) (0.0641) 
Effect in 2004 0.113** -0.0184 -0.0556 -0.0598 0.132* -0.0256 -0.0231 -0.0854 0.0968 -0.00373 -0.0746 -0.0529 
(0.0561) (0.0429) (0.108) (0.0620) (0.0801) (0.0611) (0.122) (0.0752) (0.0655) (0.0475) (0.112) (0.0653) 
Effect in 2005 0.0875 -0.0462 -0.0822 -0.0574 0.117 -0.0547 -0.0376 -0.0796 0.0763 -0.0321 -0.101 -0.0494 
(0.0563) (0.0417) (0.108) (0.0612) (0.0796) (0.0595) (0.121) (0.0735) (0.0658) (0.0467) (0.113) (0.0642) 
Effect in 2006 0.0600 -0.0636 -0.104 -0.115* 0.0608 -0.0815 -0.0978 -0.144* 0.0707 -0.0534 -0.102 -0.111* 
(0.0563) (0.0439) (0.107) (0.0642) (0.0868) (0.0629) (0.125) (0.0783) (0.0649) (0.0486) (0.111) (0.0671) 
Multiple Treatments 0.00657 -0.0138* 0.0136 -0.00822   0.0144 -0.00783 0.0176 -0.0124 
(0.00782) (0.00712) (0.00915) (0.00752)   (0.0104) (0.00890) (0.0112) (0.00881) 
Domestic Capital -0.0147*** -0.144***   -0.0138**   -0.119** -0.0148***   -0.154*** 
(0.00568) (0.0394)   (0.00570)   (0.0478) (0.00569)   (0.0416) 
Imported Capital 0.0143 0.0770**   0.0142   0.0949** 0.0144   0.0811** 
  (0.00900)   (0.0319)   (0.00902)   (0.0415)   (0.00900)   (0.0359)   
Observations 78,137 76,878 2.698 2,674 77,479 76,220 2,040 2,016 77,847 76,592 2.408 2,388 
R-squared 0.707 0.445 0.694 0.446 0.705 0.445 0.653 0.457 0.705 0.445 0.664 0.439 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6. Concluding remarks 
We have addressed the question whether FINEM and Automatic BNDES loans 
help relax credit constraints hampering the productivity of Brazilian manufacturers from 
the perspective of what would have happened to the granted firms had they not been 
supported by BNDES but their credit constraints had been nonetheless otherwise 
removed. In so doing, we have taken a difference-in-differences approach carefully 
evaluating alternative treatment and control groups. We have first checked whether 
firms granted BNDES loans were indeed credit constrained before treatment and found 
supportive evidence for firms that were granted more than once. We have then looked at 
productivity growth and found that, by giving granted firms the resources to implement 
their projects, BNDES support has allowed them to perform like otherwise similar non-
credit-constrained non-granted firms. On the other hand, firms that have requested 
financial support only once do not seem to be credit constrained before being granted, 
and perform similarly to those non-granted after receiving government support.  
Overall, our findings suggest that credit constraints facing Brazilian 
manufacturing firms are real, at least for firms that apply to BNDES repeatedly and 
BNDES funding has allowed beneficiaries to match the performance of similar 
unconstrained firms in terms of productivity but not to outperform them.   
These findings have important policy implications. Government support of the 
type provided by BNDES can allow credit constrained firms to perform as otherwise 
similar unconstrained ones. It might also increase firm average productivity by making 
constrained firms more productive than they would otherwise be. There is, however, no 
evidence that this type of government support can make firms choose better projects 
than they would choose on their own in the absence of credit constraints. 
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In the trade literature with heterogeneous firms, only the most productive firms 
are able to export (see, e.g., Melitz, 2013, and Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Therefore, 
productivity improvements are required to enter the international market. Credit 
constraints make it difficult for firms to raise their performance and consequently to 
export. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that removing firms’ credit 
constraint enables firms to perform similar to unconstrained firms. As a consequence, 
firms become capable to export. In our study, 10% of the beneficiaries started to export 
after being granted, and their export growth was 50% higher than Brazilian total export 
growth. Understanding the links between credit restriction, productivity improvements 
and export performance remains a promising direction for future research in 
international trade. 
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Appendix I: List of Variables 
 
Table A.1: Description of Variables 
Variables Variable Description Source 
Multinationals Number of Multinationals BACEN 
% Multinationals Share of Multinationals BACEN 
Labor Productivity Value Added / Number of Employees PIA 
Value Added Value Added  PIA 
Number of Employees Number of Employees PIA 
Average Wage Total Wages / Number of Employees PIA 
Investment Total Investment PIA 
Capital Stock Capital Stock calculated by Perpetual Inventory (using Energy Consumption) PIA 
Total Revenue Total Revenue (including Financial Revenue, for example) PIA 
Selling Revenue Net Selling Revenues (only Goods) PIA 
Market Share Market Share by Net Selling Revenues PIA 
Total Production Value Value of Total Production (before taxes) PIA 
Energy Consumption Expenditure in Electricity and Fuel Expenditure PIA 
Profitability Net Profits / Total Revenue PIA 
Net Profit Net Profits PIA 
Cash Flow Net Profits plus Depreciation & Amortizations PIA 
Financial Status Financial Expenditure / Total Costs PIA 
Solvency Financial Expenditure / Net Selling Revenue PIA 
Financial Expenditures Financial Expenditure PIA 
Total Cost Total Cost PIA 
Efficiency Production Cost / Total Production Value PIA 
Tax 1 Production Taxes / Selling Gross Revenue PIA 
Tax 2 All Taxes (Production + Land) / Selling Gross Revenue PIA 
Employees Growth Annual Growth of Total Number of Employees PIA 
Revenue Growth Annual Growth of Net Selling Revenue PIA 
Productivity Growth Annual Growth of Productivity PIA 
Profit Growth Annual Growth of Profits PIA 
Number Firms 
Profitable Number of Firms which have earn Profits PIA 
Share of Profitable Share of Profitable Firms PIA 
Rich Region Number of Firms in Rich Regions PIA 
% Rich Region Share of Firms in Rich Regions PIA 
Small Size Number of Firms which Number of Employees is less than 100 PIA 
Medium Size Number of Firms which Number of Employees is greater than 100 and less than 500 PIA 
Large Size Number of Firms which Number of Employees is greater than 500 PIA 
Share of Small Share of Small Firms ( < 100) PIA 
Share of Medium Share of Medium Firms ( > 100 e < 500) PIA 
Share of Large Share of Large Firms ( > 500) PIA 
OCDE Classification High, Medium-High, Medium-Low and Low Technology PIA & OCDE 
Export Coefficient Total Exports / Total Production Value PIA & SECEX 
Import Coefficient Total Imports / Total Production Value PIA & SECEX 
Input Imports Coef Intermediates Goods Imports / Manufacturing Operation Cost PIA & SECEX 
Capital Imports Coef Capital Goods Imports / Investments PIA & SECEX 
Age Number of Years of Firm's existence RAIS 
Workers' Schooling Number of Years Spent on Education RAIS 
Skill Worker % Share of Workers with at least Undergraduated Level Completed RAIS 
Capital Imports Capital Goods Imports SECEX 
Input Imports Intermediates Goods Imports SECEX 
Total Exports Total Volume of Exports FOB SECEX 
Export Status Percentage of Firms wich have exported during 1996 and 2006 SECEX 
Total Imports Total Volume of Imports FOB SECEX 
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Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A.2: Average of Some Variables for Financed Firms in 1998 and Non Financed Firms One Year Before Treatment (in 1997) 
Firms' Type Non Treated Firms Treated Firms   
Variables 
All Firms over 30 
employees 
Survived and 
Invested from 1996 
to 2006 
First Treated in 
2007 
All First Time in 
1998 
Automatic BNDES 
First Time in 1998 
All only in 1998 Unit 
Number of Firms 21,380 6,344 128 141 112 75   
Age 20.1 22.6 22.1 26.6 25.0 24.4 Years 
Labor Productivity 26.6 26.8 27.0 35.5 29.7 31.8 R$ thousand / worker 
Labor Productivity Growth 30.3% 26.0% 14.3% 31.7% 27.6% 34.6% % 
TFP Levinhson-Petrin 100 101 93 115 107 106 TFP All Firms = 100 
TFP Growth -3.2% -1.1% -2.9% 0.5% -1.6% 0.0% % 
Investment / Capital 3.7% 4.0% 4.2% 6.6% 6.9% 5.5% % 
Cash Flow / Capital 12.3% 16.7% 19.0% 10.5% 10.4% 11.2% % 
Export Status 32.2% 40.0% 38.3% 58.9% 54.5% 49.3% % 
Value Added 6.84 7.40 12.07 28.90 9.99 24.95 R$ millions 
Number of Employees 175 196 255 620 332 468 Number 
Average Wage 22.0 23.3 21.4 31.5 26.9 24.8 R$ thousand / worker 
Workers' Schooling 6.7 6.7 6.5 7.1 7.0 6.9 Years 
Skilled Worker % 5.8% 6.8% 5.7% 9.2% 8.1% 9.2% % 
Investment 1.17 0.86 1.24 5.45 1.58 4.79 R$ millions 
Capital Stock 1 31.58 19.61 34.86 84.45 29.02 53.87 R$ millions 
Capital Stock 2 32.35 18.15 32.19 113.44 33.22 81.44 R$ millions 
Total Revenue 17.01 16.56 25.21 80.71 22.66 82.02 R$ millions 
Selling Revenue 15.71 15.41 21.65 72.91 21.22 73.50 R$ millions 
Market Share 0.09% 0.11% 0.12% 0.33% 0.11% 0.31% % 
Total Production Value 14.96 14.90 21.60 68.49 20.86 64.88 R$ millions 
Capital Imports 0.32 0.30 0.30 3.49 0.28 5.64 R$ billions 
Input Imports 1.18 1.20 1.54 3.97 0.63 4.20 R$ billions 
Energy Consumption 1.00 0.99 1.23 5.99 0.93 2.54 R$ millions 
Profitability 5.85% 6.69% 7.92% 5.68% 5.89% 6.38% % 
Net Profit 1.00 1.11 2.00 4.58 1.34 5.23 R$ millions 
Financial Status 3.9% 3.6% 3.2% 4.7% 4.5% 5.0% % 
Solvency 1 3.9% 3.0% 2.2% 2.8% 2.8% 3.1% % 
Solvency 2 3.6% 2.8% 1.9% 2.5% 2.6% 2.8% % 
Financial Expenditures 0.62 0.46 0.47 2.05 0.59 2.28 R$ millions 
Total Cost 18.2 16.6 24.4 79.3 22.1 80.2 R$ millions 
Efficiency 52% 50% 53% 52% 52% 51% % 
Tax 1 17% 16% 16% 15% 15% 15% % 
Tax 2 17% 16% 17% 15% 15% 15% % 
Total Exports 1.87 1.75 4.47 9.27 1.13 6.45 R$ millions 
Total Imports 1.75 1.78 2.14 8.67 1.20 11.68 R$ millions 
Export Coefficient 4.9% 6.1% 7.7% 6.5% 5.6% 5.1% % 
Import Coefficient 4.2% 4.6% 5.3% 5.6% 4.6% 4.5% % 
Input Imports Coefficient 4% 5% 7% 6% 5% 5% % 
Capital Imports Coefficient 5% 6% 8% 9% 9% 5% % 
Employees Growth 0.1% 4.3% 1.8% 8.8% 10.3% 6.2% % 
Revenue Growth 22.1% 20.6% 16.9% 17.5% 13.7% 13.8% % 
Profit Growth 45.8% 50.1% 15.3% 44.4% 50.3% 65.1% % 
Number Firms Profitable 4,344 1,740 36 40 34 24 Number 
Share of Profitable 20.3% 27.4% 28.1% 28.4% 30.4% 32.0% % 
Multinationals 1,089 509 7 21 13 8 Number 
% Multinationals 5.09% 8.02% 5.47% 14.89% 11.61% 10.67% % 
Rich Region 18,165 5,505 119 124 97 61 Number 
% Rich Region 85% 87% 93% 88% 87% 81% % 
Small Size 14,416 3,584 69 43 42 31 Number 
Medium Size 5,686 2,304 45 57 48 27 Number 
Large Size 1,278 456 14 41 22 17 Number 
Share of Small 67% 56% 54% 30% 38% 41% % 
Share of Medium 27% 36% 35% 40% 43% 36% % 
Share of Large 6% 7% 11% 29% 20% 23% % 
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Table A.2: Average of Some Variables from Financed Firms in 1998 and Non Financed Firms One Year Before Treatment (in 1997) 
OCDE Classification               
High & Medium-High Tech 4,732 1,648 23 45 36 26 Number 
Medium-Low Tech 5,360 1,789 36 30 18 13 Number 
Low Tech 11,288 2,907 69 66 58 36 Number 
Share High & Medium-High Tech 22% 26% 18% 32% 32% 35% % 
Share Medium-Low Tech 25% 28% 28% 21% 16% 17% % 
Share Low Tech 53% 46% 54% 47% 52% 48% % 
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Appendix III: Propensity score matching 
 
Table A.3.a: Comparing Group 5 after Matching with Non Granted 
  Non-Treated Treated Testing Matched Firms 
  Not Matched Matched Matched Not Matched t Value P-value 
Capital Stock 18 26 30 20 -0.49 62.8% 
Number of Employees 192 312 337 297 -0.36 72.1% 
Solvency 3.0% 2.4% 2.6% 4.3% -0.39 69.8% 
Profit 6.7% 6.1% 6.5% 1.0% -0.40 68.6% 
Profit Growth 49% 87% 51% -23% 1.22 22.5% 
Employment Growth 4% 4% 9% 19% -1.21 22.9% 
Revenue Growth 21% 18% 16% 0% 0.51 61.0% 
Market Share 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.00% -1.43 15.3% 
Multinational Status 8% 6% 13% 0% -1.69 9.2% 
Rich 87% 85% 88% 77% -0.62 53.7% 
Labor Productivity 26.7 25.2 31.7 14.1 -1.72 8.7% 
TFP Productivity 99.6 100 102.7 93.5 -1.55 12.3% 
Investment 0.8 1.4 1.6 1.6 -0.25 80.5% 
Cash Flow / Capital 16.8% 10.8% 10.1% 12.4% 0.41 68.2% 
Investment / Capital 4.0% 4.4% 7.0% 6.4% -2.94 0.3% 
Number of Firms 6235 99 99 13     
 
 
Table A.3.b: Comparing Group 3 after Matching with Non Granted 
  Non-Treated Treated Testing Matched Firms 
  Not Matched Matched Matched Not Matched t Value P-value 
Capital Stock 20 27 35 177 -0.42 67.4% 
Number of Employees 195 298 302 1,553 -0.05 95.8% 
Solvency 3.0% 2.5% 3.1% 2.8% 1.42 15.9% 
Profit 6.7% 6.8% 7.0% 2.4% -0.10 92.2% 
Profit Growth 50% 54% 63% 117% -0.27 79.1% 
Employment Growth 4% 3% 5% 18% -0.33 74.4% 
Revenue Growth 21% 19% 15% 9% 0.81 41.9% 
Market Share 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 1.6% -0.65 51.4% 
Multinational Status 8% 6% 9% 20% -0.65 51.4% 
Rich 87% 85% 83% 70% 0.24 81.3% 
Labor Productivity 26.9 25.7 31.5 33.7 -1.12 26.7% 
TFP Productivity 99.6 100.2 102.2 99.1 -1.36 17.5% 
Investment 0.9 0.6 2.5 18.0 -1.78 7.8% 
Cash Flow / Capital 16.7% 10.5% 10.3% 17% 0.08 93.6% 
Investment / Capital 4.0% 5.9% 4.1% 14.4% 1.59 11.2% 
Number of Firms 6279 65 65 10     
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Table A.3.c: Comparing Group 2 after Matching with Non Granted 
  Non-Treated Treated Testing Matched Firms 
  Not Matched Matched Matched Not Matched t Value P-value 
Capital Stock 12 48 74 43 -0.98 33.0% 
Number of Employees 131 384 561 464 -1.61 10.8% 
Solvency 3.9% 2.5% 2.6% 3.2% -0.27 78.6% 
Profit 6.0% 5.4% 6.2% 4.4% -0.91 36.3% 
Profit Growth 55% 4% 1% 32% 1.45 15.1% 
Employment Growth -1% 12% 9% 10% 0.55 58.0% 
Revenue Growth 20% 102% 18% 14% 1.13 26.1% 
Market Share 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% -1.19 23.6% 
Multinational Status 5% 10% 14% 10% -1.01 31.4% 
Rich 84% 89% 90% 79% -0.18 85.9% 
Labor Productivity 67.2 136.7 101.6 97.9 1.09 27.6% 
TFP Productivity 100.2 83.4 80.5 88.7 0.87 38.6% 
Investment 1.7 17.2 14.4 10.4 0.21 83.2% 
Number of Firms 18,240 169 169 58     
Results on Cash Flow/Investment and Investment/Capital show similar patterns and are 
available upon request. 
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Table A.3.d: Comparing Group 4 after Matching with Non Granted 
  Non-Treated Treated Testing Matched Firms 
  Not Matched Matched Matched Not Matched t Value P-value 
Capital Stock 12 18 51 31 -2.07 4.1% 
Number of Employees 133 263 438 380 -1.48 14.1% 
Solvency 3.9% 2.6% 2.9% 3.4% -0.57 56.9% 
Profit 6.0% 5.0% 6.8% 4.4% -1.63 10.4% 
Profit Growth 55% 5% 1% -1% 1.32 19.3% 
Employment Growth -1% 7% 7% 17% 0.04 96.8% 
Revenue Growth 21% 32% 16% 16% 1.53 12.8% 
Market Share 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% -1.40 16.5% 
Multinational Status 5% 10% 14% 10% 0.23 81.9% 
Rich 84% 90% 87% 77% 0.64 52.6% 
Labor Productivity 67.7 91.5 83.5 86.3 0.51 60.8% 
TFP Productivity 100.1 86.9 83.6 99.1 0.85 39.4% 
Investment 1.9 2.6 12.8 6.7 -1.85 6.7% 
Number of Firms 18.301 108 108 35     
Results on Cash Flow/Investment and Investment/Capital show similar patterns and are 
available upon request. 
 
 
 
Table A.3.e: Comparing Group 6 after Matching with Non Granted 
  Non-Treated Treated Testing Matched Firms 
  Not Matched Matched Matched Not Matched t Value P-value 
Capital Stock 12 22 30 16 -1.21 22.6% 
Number of Employees 131 286 333 251 -0.84 40.1% 
Solvency 3.9% 2.4% 2.5% 3.6% -0.19 85.0% 
Profit 6.0% 5.2% 6.4% 4.8% -1.36 17.4% 
Profit Growth 55% 5% 1% 45% 1.56 12.4% 
Employment Growth -1% 11% 9% 15% 0.21 83.4% 
Revenue Growth 20% 112% 16% 13% 1.11 27.0% 
Market Share 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% -0.67 50.3% 
Multinational Status 5% 8% 10% 9% -0.60 54.6% 
Rich 84% 91% 90% 80% 0.40 69.2% 
Labor Productivity 67.5 88.1 88.0 70.6 0.01 98.9% 
TFP Productivity 100.1 86.4 86.2 97.7 0.06 95.0% 
Investment 1.8 3.8 4.1 3.9 -0.24 81.0% 
Number of Firms 18.237 144 144 46     
Results on Cash Flow/Investment and Investment/Capital show similar patterns and are 
available upon request. 
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Appendix IV: Credit constraints for alternative treated groups 
 
Table A.4.a: Credit Restriction for Group 3 
Dependent Variable: Invest / K Group A Group B Group C Paired Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cash Flow / K 0.000827*** 0.000519 0.0141 0.0871 
 (0.00041) (0.00109) (0.0159) (0.0656) 
BNDES * Cash Flow / K 0.0599 0.0549 0.0544 0.0836 
 (0.0373) (0.0370) (0.0452) (0.0686) 
Sales / K -0.00029*** -0.000423*** -0.00131** -0.0417*** 
 (3.45e-05) (0.000158) (0.00558) (0.00978) 
Sales / K lagged in time 0.000352*** 0.000290*** 0.000952*** 0.0344*** 
 (1.95e-05) (2.43e-05) (0.000258) (0.00673) 
OCDE Tech. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multinational Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18.038 6.419 203 128 
R-squared 0.110 0.129 0.246 0.324 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table A.4.b: Credit Restriction for Group 5 
Dependent Variable: Invest / K Group A Group B Group C Paired Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cash Flow / K 0.000814*** 0.000430 -0.00642 0.0664 
 (0.000411) (0.00110) (0.0167) (0.0426) 
BNDES * Cash Flow / K 0.135*** 0.126*** 0.114** 0.0728 
 (0.0349) (0.0346) (0.0485) (0.0646) 
Sales / K -0.00029*** -0.000414*** -0.00106 -0.0524*** 
 (3.46e-05) (0.000159) (0.00404) (0.0113) 
Sales / K lagged in time 0.000352*** 0.000290*** 0.000501*** 0.0299*** 
 (1.96e-05) (2.44e-05) (0.000208) (0.00587) 
OCDE Tech. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multinational Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18.075 6.456 240 180 
R-squared 0.111 0.131 0.207 0.222 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix V: Post-treatment performance for alternative treated groups 
 
Table A.5.a: Results of Difference-in-Differences (More than Once) 
Treated Group Group 1 Group 2 
Control Group Group A Paired Group A Paired 
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP 
Effect in 1998 0.130** 0.00176 0.103 0.00371 0.0562 0.00904 0.0531 -0.000451 
(0.0577) (0.00870) (0.102) (0.00319) (0.0625) (0.00845) (0.0951) (0.00176) 
Effect in 1999 0.150*** -0.00273 0.0940 0.00188 0.0922 0.00208 0.0838 -0.00264 
(0.0549) (0.00916) (0.0983) (0.00291) (0.0573) (0.00993) (0.129) (0.00181) 
Effect in 2000 0.181*** -0.0853 0.194 0.00112 0.124* -0.0829 0.0589 -0.00167 
(0.0562) (0.0714) (0.118) (0.00286) (0.0665) (0.0700) (0.122) (0.00115) 
Effect in 2001 0.163*** -0.0115 0.195* 0.00101 0.137*** -0.00943 -0.00842 -0.00216* 
(0.0589) (0.0109) (0.119) (0.00278) (0.0513) (0.0108) (0.0757) (0.00115) 
Effect in 2002 0.169*** -0.0165* 0.0724 0.00245 0.126** -0.0136 0.0906 -0.00113 
(0.0567) (0.00976) (0.0736) (0.00285) (0.0495) (0.00982) (0.0848) (0.00126) 
Effect in 2003 0.126** -0.0117 0.104 0.000838 0.0703 -0.00960 0.0553 -0.00198* 
(0.0529) (0.0103) (0.0743) (0.00276) (0.0500) (0.0114) (0.0865) (0.00113) 
Effect in 2004 0.0993* -0.0269** 0.0918 -0.000126 0.0424 -0.0259** 0.0638 -0.00217* 
(0.0583) (0.0125) (0.0760) (0.00309) (0.0537) (0.0131) (0.0910) (0.00120) 
Effect in 2005 0.0573 -0.0300* 0.0717 -6.61e-05 0.0176 -0.0289* 0.0282 -0.00317** 
(0.0587) (0.0164) (0.0763) (0.00307) (0.0515) (0.0168) (0.0856) (0.00151) 
Effect in 2006 0.0122 -0.0528*** 0.0789 0.000593 -0.0216 -0.0516*** -0.0242 -0.00248** 
(0.0581) (0.0174) (0.0744) (0.00276) (0.0516) (0.0179) (0.0800) (0.00125) 
Multiple Treatments 0.00255 0.0129*** 0.0120 0.000218 0.0182** 0.0137*** 0.0315*** 0.000259** 
(0.00802) (0.00403) (0.0102) (0.000148) (0.00882) (0.00431) (0.00969) (0.000121) 
Domestic Capital 0.0194*** -0.0217   0.0190***   -0.0156 
(0.00450) (0.0301)   (0.00450)   (0.0326) 
Imported Capital 0.0181** 0.0529**   0.0189**   0.0357 
(0.00904) (0.0225)   (0.00906)   (0.0360) 
Imported Input 0.436*** 0.0777*** 0.710*** 0.0224*** 0.439*** 0.0774*** 0.598** 0.00476** 
(0.0966) (0.0224) (0.199) (0.00703) (0.0970) (0.0223) (0.279) (0.00191) 
Export Coefficient 0.203*** 0.00188 0.118* 0.00408*** 0.204*** 0.00186 0.0904 0.00215** 
(0.0384) (0.0133) (0.0662) (0.00122) (0.0386) (0.0133) (0.0691) (0.00104) 
Import Coefficient -1.211*** -0.115*** -1.156*** -0.0341*** -1.218*** -0.115*** -1.426*** -0.00890*** 
(0.163) (0.0338) (0.331) (0.00793) (0.164) (0.0335) (0.520) (0.00204) 
Net Sales Revenue 0.496*** -0.0468*** 0.584*** -0.00301*** 0.496*** -0.0468*** 0.630*** -0.00249*** 
(0.00490) (0.00879) (0.0275) (0.000410) (0.00489) (0.00878) (0.0289) (0.000279) 
Number of Employees -0.423*** -0.582***   -0.423***   -0.560*** 
(0.00666) (0.0395)   (0.00665)   (0.0372) 
Cost / Revenue -2.010*** -0.163*** -1.670*** -0.0158*** -2.009*** -0.163*** -1.554*** -0.0158*** 
(0.0750) (0.0433) (0.378) (0.00365) (0.0748) (0.0432) (0.237) (0.00496) 
Firms' Age -0.0175*** -0.0817*** 0.0997* -0.000177 -0.0174*** -0.0815*** -0.106** -0.00194*** 
(0.00380) (0.0283) (0.0516) (0.000829) (0.00380) (0.0282) (0.0422) (0.000484) 
Years of Schooling -0.0162* -0.0195 0.266** 0.00244 -0.0165* -0.0195 -0.0499 0.000118 
(0.00971) (0.0141) (0.115) (0.00245) (0.00970) (0.0141) (0.0594) (0.00112) 
Skilled Labor 0.309*** 0.0198 -0.0225 -0.0104*** 0.312*** 0.0202 0.517*** 0.00170 
(0.0350) (0.0436) (0.195) (0.00341) (0.0349) (0.0437) (0.147) (0.00181) 
Average Salary 0.567*** 0.0534*** 0.435*** 0.000782 0.566*** 0.0534*** 0.400*** 0.000586 
(0.00682) (0.0118) (0.0351) (0.000930) (0.00681) (0.0118) (0.0390) (0.000599) 
Investment 0.0103*** -0.00394*** 0.00989** -0.000204*** 0.0104*** -0.00393*** 0.0172*** -0.000149*** 
  (0.000421) (0.000930) (0.00389) (6.66e-05) (0.000421) (0.000927) (0.00329) (4.33e-05) 
Solvency 1.272*** 0.0103 1.323*** 0.00349 1.270*** 0.0103 1.734*** 0.00977 
(0.0856) (0.0273) (0.265) (0.00347) (0.0854) (0.0273) (0.327) (0.00827) 
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Table A.5.a: Results of Difference-in-Differences (More than Once) - Continuation 
Revenue Growth -0.461*** 0.0176*** -0.373** 0.00294*** -0.461*** 0.0176*** -0.364*** 0.00160* 
(0.0126) (0.00592) (0.145) (0.000706) (0.0126) (0.00590) (0.125) (0.000832) 
Employment Growth 0.463*** 0.0186 0.478*** -0.000764 0.463*** 0.0186 0.460*** -0.000303 
(0.0117) (0.0223) (0.162) (0.00142) (0.0117) (0.0222) (0.130) (0.000666) 
Productivity Growth 0.492*** 0.000691 0.483*** 9.54e-05 0.492*** 0.000676 0.483*** 0.000305** 
(0.00995) (0.000564) (0.168) (0.000134) (0.00994) (0.000567) (0.132) (0.000134) 
Profitable 0.170*** -0.00544 0.00363 -0.000476 0.170*** -0.00544 0.0772*** -0.000454 
(0.00772) (0.00948) (0.0251) (0.000510) (0.00770) (0.00945) (0.0231) (0.000422) 
Multinational Status 0.0506*** 0.0120*** -0.0659* 0.00181** 0.0492*** 0.0115*** 0.00730 0.00130*** 
(0.0109) (0.00375) (0.0371) (0.000873) (0.0109) (0.00355) (0.0359) (0.000416) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OCDE Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 203.418 175.963 2.336 2.317 203.943 176.488 2.703 2.689 
R-squared 0.693 0.481 0.779 0.495 0.694 0.481 0.754 0.547 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5.b: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Just Once) 
Treated Group Group 3 Group 4 
Control Group Group A Paired Group A Paired 
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP 
Effect in 1998 0.0261 0.0194** 0.00939 -0.0165 0.0493 0.0119 0.113 -0.000821 
(0.0822) (0.00868) (0.104) (0.0174) (0.0902) (0.0109) (0.135) (0.00237) 
Effect in 1999 0.0508 0.00920 -0.0456 -0.00399 0.0763 0.00202 0.0163 -0.00253 
(0.0722) (0.00931) (0.103) (0.00354) (0.0821) (0.0121) (0.158) (0.00253) 
Effect in 2000 0.0432 -0.0759 -0.0694 -0.000177 0.0730 -0.0825 -0.0322 -0.00112 
(0.0972) (0.0724) (0.109) (0.00291) (0.1000) (0.0706) (0.163) (0.00135) 
Effect in 2001 0.0752 -0.00510 -0.0422 -0.00177 0.108 -0.0111 -0.0578 -0.00149 
(0.0559) (0.0101) (0.112) (0.00293) (0.0721) (0.0123) (0.105) (0.00137) 
Effect in 2002 0.0710 -0.0106 0.0728 -5.14e-05 0.109 -0.0159 0.0471 0.000458 
(0.0510) (0.00908) (0.103) (0.00304) (0.0681) (0.0116) (0.117) (0.00166) 
Effect in 2003 0.0608 -0.000425 0.121 -0.000950 0.102 -0.00522 0.142 -0.000398 
(0.0516) (0.0121) (0.103) (0.00273) (0.0668) (0.0144) (0.118) (0.00135) 
Effect in 2004 0.0246 -0.0204 0.168 5.31e-05 0.0702 -0.0244 0.0938 -0.000715 
(0.0589) (0.0127) (0.117) (0.00289) (0.0713) (0.0157) (0.125) (0.00148) 
Effect in 2005 0.0122 -0.0272* 0.117 0.001000 0.0626 -0.0305* 0.0483 -0.00234 
(0.0498) (0.0153) (0.112) (0.00301) (0.0652) (0.0180) (0.107) (0.00201) 
Effect in 2006 -0.0647 -0.0535*** 0.0128 -0.00271 -0.0138 -0.0567*** 0.0195 -0.000935 
(0.0567) (0.0165) (0.117) (0.00291) (0.0709) (0.0187) (0.115) (0.00151) 
Domestic Capital 0.0196*** -0.0182   0.0196***   0.0855* 
(0.00450) (0.0300)   (0.00450)   (0.0491) 
Imported Capital 0.0186** 0.000187   0.0187**   0.0627 
(0.00907) (0.0319)   (0.00907)   (0.0451) 
Imported Input 0.440*** 0.0775*** 0.673*** 0.00105 0.439*** 0.0774*** 0.686** 0.00234 
(0.0970) (0.0224) (0.184) (0.00408) (0.0970) (0.0224) (0.337) (0.00177) 
Export Coefficient 0.206*** 0.00220 -0.373*** -0.0126 0.206*** 0.00221 0.141 0.00284* 
(0.0387) (0.0135) (0.0943) (0.0179) (0.0387) (0.0135) (0.0953) (0.00166) 
Import Coefficient -1.218*** -0.115*** -0.671** -0.0119 -1.218*** -0.115*** -1.924*** -0.00763*** 
(0.164) (0.0335) (0.278) (0.0103) (0.164) (0.0335) (0.590) (0.00222) 
Net Sales Revenue 0.495*** -0.0470*** 0.625*** 
-
0.00265*** 0.495*** -0.0470*** 0.591*** -0.00286*** 
(0.00491) (0.00884) (0.0242) (0.000551) (0.00491) (0.00884) (0.0352) (0.000368) 
Number of Employees -0.422*** -0.643***   -0.422***   -0.568*** 
(0.00668) (0.0478)   (0.00668)   (0.0482) 
Cost / Revenue -2.010*** -0.163*** -2.106*** -0.0329*** -2.010*** -0.163*** -1.809*** -0.0193*** 
(0.0750) (0.0433) (0.221) (0.0109) (0.0750) (0.0433) (0.299) (0.00705) 
Firms' Age -0.0175*** -0.0817*** 0.0840** -0.00554 -0.0175*** -0.0817*** -0.104** -0.00216*** 
(0.00380) (0.0282) (0.0334) (0.00366) (0.00380) (0.0282) (0.0529) (0.000672) 
Years of Schooling -0.0171* -0.0197 -0.122 0.00516 -0.0172* -0.0197 -0.105 -0.000634 
(0.00971) (0.0142) (0.0796) (0.00869) (0.00971) (0.0142) (0.0745) (0.00163) 
Skilled Labor 0.316*** 0.0203 0.678*** -0.00718 0.317*** 0.0205 0.676*** 0.00361 
(0.0351) (0.0441) (0.185) (0.0102) (0.0351) (0.0441) (0.174) (0.00252) 
Average Salary 0.567*** 0.0535*** 0.287*** 0.000431 0.567*** 0.0535*** 0.426*** 0.000753 
(0.00683) (0.0118) (0.0401) (0.00105) (0.00683) (0.0118) (0.0534) (0.000933) 
Investment 0.0104*** -0.00394*** 0.0150*** 5.20e-05 0.0104*** -0.00394*** 0.0174*** -0.000111* 
(0.000422) (0.000927) (0.00289) (0.000255) (0.000422) (0.000927) (0.00445) (5.96e-05) 
Solvency 1.272*** 0.0107 1.212*** 0.0231** 1.272*** 0.0107 2.279*** 0.0239* 
(0.0855) (0.0273) (0.170) (0.0114) (0.0855) (0.0273) (0.399) (0.0144) 
Revenue Growth -0.461*** 0.0176*** -0.343*** -0.000823 -0.461*** 0.0176*** -0.361** 0.00149 
(0.0126) (0.00591) (0.0729) (0.00291) (0.0126) (0.00591) (0.146) (0.00123) 
  
50 
 
Table A.5.b: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Just Once) - Continuation 
Employment Growth 0.463*** 0.0187 0.273*** 0.000367 0.463*** 0.0187 0.415** -0.000180 
(0.0118) (0.0223) (0.0905) (0.00144) (0.0118) (0.0223) (0.167) (0.000933) 
Productivity Growth 0.492*** 0.000671 0.411*** 0.000273 0.492*** 0.000670 0.476*** 0.000301* 
(0.00994) (0.000568) (0.0678) (0.000645) (0.00994) (0.000568) (0.151) (0.000173) 
Profitable 0.171*** -0.00538 0.0451* -0.00158 0.171*** -0.00537 0.101*** -0.000238 
(0.00773) (0.00948) (0.0241) (0.00164) (0.00773) (0.00948) (0.0318) (0.000615) 
Multinational Status 0.0504*** 0.0116*** 0.0334 0.00490 0.0502*** 0.0116*** 0.0490 0.00266*** 
(0.0110) (0.00368) (0.0540) (0.00343) (0.0110) (0.00367) (0.0609) (0.000839) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OCDE Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 203.128 175.677 1.203 1.189 203.150 175.696 1.674 1.661 
R-squared 0.693 0.11 0.870 0.191 0.693 0.481 0.761 0.391 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5.c: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Automatic BNDES) 
Treated Group Group 5 Group 6 
Control Group Group A Paired Group A Paired 
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP 
Effect in 1998 0.137** 0.00210 0.0555 0.00610 0.0966* 0.0127 0.0527 -0.000609 
(0.0665) (0.00930) (0.0960) (0.00524) (0.0579) (0.00941) (0.108) (0.00199) 
Effect in 1999 0.160*** -0.00361 0.0425 0.00423 0.0935 0.00447 0.0831 -0.00343* 
(0.0618) (0.00954) (0.0917) (0.00466) (0.0658) (0.0113) (0.148) (0.00204) 
Effect in 2000 0.195*** -0.0851 -0.0159 0.00265 0.125 -0.0800 0.0633 -0.00204 
(0.0610) (0.0711) (0.102) (0.00445) (0.0763) (0.0684) (0.141) (0.00124) 
Effect in 2001 0.161** -0.0140 -0.00923 0.00222 0.137** -0.00905 -0.0236 -0.00252** 
(0.0631) (0.0111) (0.102) (0.00444) (0.0556) (0.0113) (0.0843) (0.00126) 
Effect in 2002 0.158** -0.0176* 0.000578 0.00471 0.108** -0.0118 0.0599 -0.00133 
(0.0634) (0.0103) (0.0974) (0.00475) (0.0548) (0.0109) (0.0952) (0.00141) 
Effect in 2003 0.105* -0.0138 0.0414 0.00301 0.0491 -0.00850 0.0241 -0.00230* 
(0.0610) (0.0107) (0.0959) (0.00432) (0.0571) (0.0125) (0.0974) (0.00125) 
Effect in 2004 0.0834 -0.0297** 0.00902 0.00198 0.0282 -0.0261* 0.00137 -0.00259* 
(0.0680) (0.0126) (0.0961) (0.00484) (0.0622) (0.0135) (0.0972) (0.00135) 
Effect in 2005 0.0429 -0.0326* 0.0174 0.000529 0.0122 -0.0289 -0.0245 -0.00359** 
(0.0687) (0.0167) (0.0943) (0.00498) (0.0594) (0.0176) (0.0887) (0.00168) 
Effect in 2006 0.0196 -0.0537*** -0.0211 0.00241 -0.0120 -0.0499*** -0.0513 -0.00301** 
(0.0667) (0.0176) (0.108) (0.00427) (0.0587) (0.0186) (0.0881) (0.00139) 
Multiple Treatments 0.0160 0.00620** 0.0378*** 0.00000867 0.0294*** 0.00889*** 0.0378*** 8.67e-05 
(0.0106) (0.00298) (0.0111) (0.000140) (0.0110) (0.00345) (0.0111) (0.000140) 
Domestic Capital 0.0193*** 0.0364   0.0189***   0.000122 
(0.00451) (0.0266)   (0.00450)   (0.0368) 
Imported Capital 0.0183** 0.0478   0.0188**   0.0664 
(0.00904) (0.0342)   (0.00906)   (0.0426) 
Imported Input 0.435*** 0.0779*** 0.828*** 0.00184 0.437*** 0.0775*** 0.652** 0.00825*** 
(0.0964) (0.0224) (0.279) (0.00388) (0.0967) (0.0224) (0.322) (0.00260) 
Export Coefficient 0.205*** 0.00199 0.263*** 0.00253 0.205*** 0.00197 0.131* 0.00200 
(0.0384) (0.0133) (0.0725) (0.00189) (0.0386) (0.0133) (0.0738) (0.00124) 
Import Coefficient -1.211*** -0.115*** -0.759* -0.00377 -1.216*** -0.115*** -1.287** -0.0122*** 
(0.163) (0.0337) (0.452) (0.00704) (0.164) (0.0334) (0.649) (0.00260) 
Net Sales Revenue 0.496*** -0.0470*** 0.593*** -0.00434*** 0.496*** -0.0469*** 0.628*** -0.00311*** 
(0.00490) (0.00883) (0.0203) (0.000560) (0.00490) (0.00882) (0.0289) (0.000348) 
Number of Employees -0.422*** -0.563***   -0.422***   -0.526*** 
(0.00668) (0.0331)   (0.00667)   (0.0434) 
Cost / Revenue -2.011*** -0.163*** -1.822*** -0.0204*** -2.009*** -0.163*** -1.563*** -0.0181*** 
(0.0751) (0.0433) (0.187) (0.00634) (0.0749) (0.0432) (0.264) (0.00576) 
Firms' Age -0.0175*** -0.0817*** -0.0217 -0.00348** -0.0176*** -0.0816*** -0.112** -0.00185*** 
(0.00380) (0.0283) (0.0246) (0.00145) (0.00380) (0.0282) (0.0455) (0.000504) 
Years of Schooling -0.0164* -0.0196 0.187*** 0.00430 -0.0165* -0.0196 -0.103 0.000700 
(0.00972) (0.0142) (0.0696) (0.00352) (0.00972) (0.0142) (0.0716) (0.00121) 
Skilled Labor 0.311*** 0.0195 0.365** 0.00303 0.314*** 0.0197 0.733*** -0.000866 
(0.0351) (0.0436) (0.182) (0.00369) (0.0351) (0.0437) (0.172) (0.00203) 
Average Salary 0.567*** 0.0535*** 0.373*** 0.000367 0.566*** 0.0535*** 0.390*** 0.000833 
(0.00683) (0.0118) (0.0285) (0.00161) (0.00682) (0.0118) (0.0412) (0.000693) 
Investment 0.0103*** -0.00394*** 0.00329 -0.000254** 0.0104*** -0.00393*** 0.0177*** -0.000129*** 
(0.000421) (0.000930) (0.00238) (0.000106) (0.000421) (0.000927) (0.00343) (4.87e-05) 
Solvency 1.271*** 0.0105 1.505*** 0.00277 1.269*** 0.0105 1.655*** 0.0126 
(0.0857) (0.0274) (0.282) (0.00501) (0.0855) (0.0273) (0.388) (0.00985) 
Revenue Growth -0.462*** 0.0176*** -0.373*** 0.00246** -0.461*** 0.0176*** -0.370*** 0.00189** 
(0.0126) (0.00593) (0.0911) (0.00101) (0.0126) (0.00591) (0.130) (0.000956) 
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Table A.5.c: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Automatic BNDES) - Continuation 
Employment Growth 0.463*** 0.0187 0.397*** -0.00419 0.463*** 0.0187 0.436*** -0.000392 
(0.0118) (0.0223) (0.0931) (0.00307) (0.0117) (0.0222) (0.136) (0.000775) 
Productivity Growth 0.492*** 0.000688 0.428*** 0.000131 0.492*** 0.000689 0.486*** 0.000302** 
(0.00995) (0.000565) (0.0677) (0.000494) (0.00994) (0.000563) (0.137) (0.000142) 
Profitable 0.171*** -0.00537 0.00879 0.00147* 0.171*** -0.00536 0.0756*** -0.000296 
(0.00773) (0.00948) (0.0241) (0.000848) (0.00771) (0.00944) (0.0251) (0.000481) 
Multinational Status 0.0516*** 0.0120*** -0.124** 0.00412** 0.0510*** 0.0117*** 0.0213 0.00136*** 
(0.0110) (0.00373) (0.0526) (0.00165) (0.0110) (0.00360) (0.0443) (0.000471) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OCDE Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 203.150 175.696 1.273 1.254 203.596 176.145 2.291 2.281 
R-squared 0.693 0.111 0.890 0.466 0.693 0.481 0.734 0.560 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5.d: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Robustness Check - unobservable time-variant characteristics) 
Treated Group Group 1 Group 3 Group 5 
Control Group Group B Group C Group B Group C Group B Group C 
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP 
Effect in 1998 0.0943* 0.0162 0.180 0.0211 0.129 0.0173 0.230 0.0197 0.105 0.0217 0.189 0.0239 
(0.0565) (0.0451) (0.156) (0.0649) (0.0865) (0.0648) (0.168) (0.0791) (0.0647) (0.0497) (0.158) (0.0684) 
Effect in 1999 0.109** -0.0210 0.0303 -0.0227 0.133* -0.0159 0.0578 -0.0279 0.121** -0.0196 0.0444 -0.0215 
(0.0533) (0.0431) (0.123) (0.0609) (0.0802) (0.0608) (0.137) (0.0735) (0.0594) (0.0456) (0.126) (0.0626) 
Effect in 2000 0.130** -0.0185 0.0742 -0.0383 0.106 -0.0333 0.0461 -0.0676 0.146** -0.0266 0.0845 -0.0457 
(0.0550) (0.0442) (0.158) (0.0613) (0.0854) (0.0621) (0.172) (0.0746) (0.0595) (0.0472) (0.160) (0.0631) 
Effect in 2001 0.128** -0.0276 0.281 0.00854 0.0971 -0.0568 0.258 -0.0335 0.127** -0.0375 0.281 0.000887 
(0.0574) (0.0415) (0.199) (0.0587) (0.0891) (0.0603) (0.210) (0.0730) (0.0614) (0.0461) (0.201) (0.0617) 
Effect in 2002 0.153*** 0.0224 0.182 0.0121 0.135 0.0168 0.175 -0.00557 0.141** 0.00287 0.167 -0.0108 
(0.0550) (0.0442) (0.130) (0.0624) (0.0845) (0.0650) (0.146) (0.0774) (0.0612) (0.0492) (0.132) (0.0656) 
Effect in 2003 0.123** -0.0284 -0.0456 -0.0402 0.141* -0.0391 -0.0240 -0.0647 0.102* -0.0347 -0.0727 -0.0507 
(0.0511) (0.0450) (0.106) (0.0606) (0.0779) (0.0630) (0.122) (0.0741) (0.0590) (0.0500) (0.110) (0.0641) 
Effect in 2004 0.113** -0.0184 -0.0556 -0.0598 0.132* -0.0256 -0.0231 -0.0854 0.0968 -0.00373 -0.0746 -0.0529 
(0.0561) (0.0429) (0.108) (0.0620) (0.0801) (0.0611) (0.122) (0.0752) (0.0655) (0.0475) (0.112) (0.0653) 
Effect in 2005 0.0875 -0.0462 -0.0822 -0.0574 0.117 -0.0547 -0.0376 -0.0796 0.0763 -0.0321 -0.101 -0.0494 
(0.0563) (0.0417) (0.108) (0.0612) (0.0796) (0.0595) (0.121) (0.0735) (0.0658) (0.0467) (0.113) (0.0642) 
Effect in 2006 0.0600 -0.0636 -0.104 -0.115* 0.0608 -0.0815 -0.0978 -0.144* 0.0707 -0.0534 -0.102 -0.111* 
(0.0563) (0.0439) (0.107) (0.0642) (0.0868) (0.0629) (0.125) (0.0783) (0.0649) (0.0486) (0.111) (0.0671) 
Multiple Treatments 0.00657 -0.0138* 0.0136 -0.00822     0.0144 -0.00783 0.0176 -0.0124 
(0.00782) (0.00712) (0.00915) (0.00752)     (0.0104) (0.00890) (0.0112) (0.00881) 
Domestic Capital -0.0147***   -0.144*** -0.0138**   -0.119** -0.0148***   -0.154*** 
(0.00568)   (0.0394) (0.00570)   (0.0478) (0.00569)   (0.0416) 
Imported Capital 0.0143   0.0770** 0.0142   0.0949** 0.0144   0.0811** 
(0.00900)   (0.0319) (0.00902)   (0.0415) (0.00900)   (0.0359) 
Imported Input 0.383*** 0.445*** 0.931*** 0.0131*** 0.381*** 0.445*** 0.962*** 0.676*** 0.381*** 0.445*** 0.890*** 0.659*** 
(0.136) (0.0598) (0.220) (0.00505) (0.136) (0.0600) (0.257) (0.108) (0.136) (0.0598) (0.238) (0.104) 
Export Coefficient 0.106*** -0.115*** -0.00709 -0.00361** 0.110*** -0.111*** 0.107 -0.240*** 0.109*** -0.114*** 0.0494 -0.323*** 
(0.0363) (0.0130) (0.0788) (0.00153) (0.0367) (0.0131) (0.0940) (0.0622) (0.0365) (0.0130) (0.0894) (0.0572) 
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Table A.5.d: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Robustness Check - unobservable time-variant characteristics) - Continuation 
Import Coefficient -1.238*** -0.582*** -1.568*** -0.0129** -1.239*** -0.578*** -1.661*** -0.802*** -1.237*** -0.579*** -1.514*** -0.826*** 
(0.182) (0.0704) (0.510) (0.00608) (0.182) (0.0706) (0.633) (0.160) (0.181) (0.0705) (0.580) (0.155) 
Net Sales Revenue 0.554*** 0.100*** 0.543*** -0.00292*** 0.552*** 0.100*** 0.525*** 0.110*** 0.554*** 0.101*** 0.542*** 0.117*** 
(0.00726) (0.00238) (0.0267) (0.000434) (0.00731) (0.00239) (0.0296) (0.0125) (0.00727) (0.00239) (0.0279) (0.0120) 
Number of 
Employees -0.349***   -0.488*** -0.336***   -0.504*** -0.334***   -0.471*** 
(0.0260)   (0.0319) (0.0289)   (0.0414) (0.0283)   (0.0399) 
Cost / Revenue -2.250*** -1.273*** -2.217*** -0.00763** -2.253*** -1.275*** -2.310*** -1.000*** -2.252*** -1.274*** -2.347*** -0.978*** 
(0.0764) (0.0276) (0.268) (0.00327) (0.0767) (0.0278) (0.307) (0.114) (0.0766) (0.0277) (0.291) (0.114) 
Firms' Age 0.0312*** -0.0535*** -0.0496 -0.000176 0.0311*** -0.0538*** -0.0629 0.0335 0.0310*** -0.0529*** -0.0560 0.0369* 
(0.00786) (0.00360) (0.0464) (0.000496) (0.00791) (0.00362) (0.0588) (0.0247) (0.00787) (0.00360) (0.0497) (0.0215) 
Years of Schooling -0.0122 -0.309*** 0.0764 0.00618*** -0.0144 -0.310*** 0.0600 -0.306*** -0.0127 -0.308*** 0.0667 -0.254*** 
(0.0144) (0.00708) (0.0701) (0.00152) (0.0145) (0.00710) (0.0852) (0.0471) (0.0145) (0.00709) (0.0856) (0.0494) 
Skilled Labor 0.127*** 0.549*** 0.0693 -0.0234*** 0.135*** 0.552*** 0.0299 0.263* 0.130*** 0.548*** 0.0946 0.317** 
(0.0469) (0.0282) (0.180) (0.00487) (0.0475) (0.0286) (0.269) (0.156) (0.0474) (0.0285) (0.227) (0.138) 
Average Salary 0.520*** 0.211*** 0.426*** 0.00273*** 0.521*** 0.211*** 0.425*** 0.161*** 0.519*** 0.210*** 0.402*** 0.156*** 
(0.00956) (0.00420) (0.0418) (0.000950) (0.00963) (0.00422) (0.0542) (0.0242) (0.00957) (0.00420) (0.0443) (0.0212) 
Investment 0.0112*** -0.00203*** 0.00338 -0.000255*** 0.0113*** -0.00201*** 0.00431 -0.000642 0.0112*** -0.00202*** 0.00319 -0.00116 
(0.000611) (0.000295) (0.00353) (6.40e-05) (0.000613) (0.000296) (0.00393) (0.00188) (0.000612) (0.000295) (0.00376) (0.00176) 
Solvency 1.323*** 0.607*** 1.795*** -0.00388 1.325*** 0.609*** 1.917*** 0.543*** 1.323*** 0.605*** 1.819*** 0.379** 
(0.0976) (0.0379) (0.298) (0.00389) (0.0980) (0.0380) (0.354) (0.192) (0.0980) (0.0380) (0.351) (0.187) 
Revenue Growth -0.444*** 0.0304*** -0.388*** 0.00410*** -0.444*** 0.0301*** -0.394*** 0.0545 -0.445*** 0.0306*** -0.412*** 0.0791** 
(0.0241) (0.00615) (0.119) (0.00106) (0.0241) (0.00617) (0.130) (0.0332) (0.0241) (0.00616) (0.126) (0.0310) 
Employment Growth 0.451*** 0.00961 0.286** -0.00218 0.452*** 0.00881 0.257 -0.0884* 0.450*** 0.00879 0.246* -0.0737* 
(0.0234) (0.00693) (0.131) (0.00147) (0.0236) (0.00699) (0.169) (0.0509) (0.0235) (0.00697) (0.145) (0.0438) 
Productivity Growth 0.475*** 0.0325*** 0.469*** 0.000164 0.475*** 0.0324*** 0.471*** 0.0139** 0.475*** 0.0325*** 0.470*** 0.0164** 
(0.0206) (0.00180) (0.116) (0.000102) (0.0207) (0.00180) (0.120) (0.00695) (0.0207) (0.00180) (0.118) (0.00711) 
Profitable 0.0907*** 0.0405*** 0.0960*** 4.41e-05 0.0918*** 0.0411*** 0.129*** 0.0408** 0.0909*** 0.0404*** 0.103*** 0.0216 
(0.00697) (0.00339) (0.0292) (0.000618) (0.00702) (0.00341) (0.0362) (0.0184) (0.00699) (0.00340) (0.0318) (0.0167) 
Multinational Status 0.0414*** -0.0648*** -0.0859** 0.000791 0.0428*** -0.0651*** -0.109* -0.141*** 0.0429*** -0.0659*** -0.0614 -0.167*** 
(0.0114) (0.00627) (0.0378) (0.000580) (0.0116) (0.00638) (0.0632) (0.0387) (0.0114) (0.00632) (0.0481) (0.0310) 
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Table A.5.d: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Robustness Check - unobservable time-variant characteristics) - Continuation 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OCDE Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 78,137 76,878 2.698 2,674 77,479 76,220 2,040 2,016 77,847 76,592 2.408 2,388 
R-squared 0.707 0.445 0.694 0.446 0.705 0.445 0.653 0.457 0.705 0.445 0.664 0.439 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix VI: Measuring TFP 
 
Our TFP measure is calculated following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) as the firm-level 
Solow residual based on a Cobb-Douglas production function with labor, capital and 
intermediates as inputs. Implementation of this approach requires the following 
variables: 
a) Labor – Measured as human capital, calculated as total number of firm 
employees times employee’s average number of years of schooling. Results 
using the total number of employees are also available upon request. 
b) Capital – As there is no measure of firm capital stock in our main database 
(PIA), we proceeded as follows. First, we used the perpetual inventory method 
to construct the capital stock at sector level using investments made from 1985 
to 1995. Then we imputed the sectoral capital stock to firms according to their 
market shares in 1995. For example, if the capital stock of sector j in 1995 were 
100 and firm i's market share were 15%, then the capital stock imputed to firm i 
would be 15. Given this initial capital stock in 1995, from then onwards the 
yearly time series of each firm’s capital stock was generated using its 
investments and depreciation. 
c) Input – The PIA dataset reports firm input expenditure. 
d) Output – We use the total value of production as our measure of production. 
To deal with possible biases arising from the fact that the firm likely makes profit-
maximizing decisions based on shocks that are unobservable to the econometrician, 
implementation of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure also requires: 
e) Energy – The PIA dataset reports firm energy expenditure. 
The estimated Cobb-Douglas coefficients when they are assumed to be the same across 
sectors and when they are allowed to differ across sectors are reported in Tables A.6.a 
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and A.6.b. respectively. These results are in line with existing estimates obtained, for 
instance, by Lopez-Cordova and Moreira (2003) from the same dataset (PIA) in the 
period 1996-2000, through the alternative Olley and Pakes (1996) approach. 
 
Table A.6.a: TFP Results for Full Sample 
Dependent Variable: 
Total Value of Production   
Human Capital 0.30 
 (0.006)***
Input Consumption  0.43 
 (0.005)***
Capital Stock  0.34 
 (0.035)***
Wald Test for Constant Returns 4.54 
P-value 3.3% 
* significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% 
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Table A.6.b: TFP Results per Sector 
Dependent Variable: Total Value of Production 
   Labor  Materials  Capital 
Food and Beverages 0.42 0.50  0.10 
(0.0082)*** (0.0145)***  (0.0056)***
Tobacco  0.41  0.30  0.10 
(0.036)***  (0.0632)***  (0.0249)***
Textiles  0.17  0.54  0.15 
(0.0096)***  (0.0204)***  (0.0103)***
Apparel  0.30  0.46  0.10 
(0.0038)***  (0.0099)***  (0.0044)***
Leather  0.28  0.37  0.13 
(0.0047)***  (0.0136)***  (0.0057)***
Wood  0.17  0.62  0.11 
(0.0073)***  (0.0285)***  (0.0062)***
Paper  0.26  0.65  0.16 
(0.0199)***  (0.0265)***  (0.012)*** 
Printing  0.18  0.96  0.23 
(0.0125)***  (0.0301)***  (0.0115)***
Coke & Refined 
Petroleum  0.47  0.92  0.18 
(0.0398)***  (0.108)***  (0.0232)***
Chemicals  0.33  0.66  0.11 
(0.0128)***  (0.0231)***  (0.0075)***
Plastic & Rubber  0.19  0.79  0.12 
(0.01)***  (0.018)***  (0.0063)***
Non‐Metalic Minerals  0.17  0.62  0.16 
(0.005)***  (0.0141)***  (0.0089)***
Basic Metals  0.34  0.33  0.18 
(0.0214)***  (0.0293)***  (0.0157)***
Metal Products  0.24  0.78  0.19 
(0.0077)***  (0.0249)***  (0.0087)***
Machinery & 
Equipment  0.23  0.70  0.20 
(0.0105)***  (0.0198)***  (0.0081)***
Office Equipment  0.27  0.75  0.18 
(0.0723)***  (0.1929)**  (0.0377)***
Electrical Equipment  0.28  0.43  0.26 
(0.0241)***  (0.0333)***  (0.0156)***
Eletronics  0.27  0.62  0.16 
(0.0205)***  (0.038)***  (0.0214)***
Health Equipments  0.28  0.46  0.24 
(0.021)***  (0.0695)***  (0.0239)***
Moto Vehicles  0.15  0.59  0.19 
(0.0118)***  (0.0243)***  (0.0127)***
Other Transport 
Equipment  0.23  0.24  0.38 
(0.0217)***  (0.0764)**  (0.0347)***
Furniture and Other 
Equipment  0.27  0.64  0.19 
   (0.0113)***  (0.0211)***  (0.0088)***
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